The contents of this volume are drawn from the seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, and represent recent advances in the development of concepts and methods in political economy. Contributors include leading practitioners working on formal, applied, and historical approaches to the subject. The collection will interest scholars in the fields of political science and political sociology no less than economics. Section 1 investigates models of voting and representation, section 2 explores dimensions of political institutions, section 3 covers strategic aspects of...
The contents of this volume are drawn from the seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, and represent recent advances in t...
This book adapts a formal model of elections and legislative politics to study party politics in Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. The approach uses the idea of valence, that is, the party leader's non-policy electoral popularity, and employs survey data to model these elections. The analysis explains why small parties in Israel and Italy keep to the electoral periphery. In the Netherlands, Britain, and the US, the electoral model is extended to include the behavior of activists. In the case of Britain, it is shown that there will be contests between activists...
This book adapts a formal model of elections and legislative politics to study party politics in Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, and the Unit...
In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro- vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken- neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic"...
In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to p...
In recent years, the usual optimization techniques, which have proved so useful in microeconomic theory, have been extended to incorporate more powerful topological and differential methods, and these methods have led to new results on the qualitative behavior of general economic and political systems. These developments have necessarily resulted in an increase in the degree of formalism in the publications in the academic journals. This formalism can often deter graduate students. The progression of ideas presented in this book will familiarize the student with the geometric concepts...
In recent years, the usual optimization techniques, which have proved so useful in microeconomic theory, have been extended to incorporate more pow...
This new book from Norman Schofield is the first to explain the spatial model of voting from an economics/mathematical/game-theoretic perspective. As such, it is at the cutting edge of research within politics and economics and will be required reading in these spheres.
This new book from Norman Schofield is the first to explain the spatial model of voting from an economics/mathematical/game-theoretic perspective. As ...
This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison's argument in Federalist X of 1787, using ideas from social choice theory and from the work of Douglass North, Mancur Olson, and William Riker. Its focus is not on rational choice theory itself, but on the use of this theory as a heuristic device to better understand democratic institutions. The treatment adapts a formal model of elections to consider rapid constitutional change at periods when societies face quandaries. The topics explored in the book include Britain's reorganization of its fiscal system in the eighteenth century...
This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison's argument in Federalist X of 1787, using ideas from social choice theory and from the w...
In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation...
In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to p...
Norman Schofield Dino Falaschetti Andrew R. Rutten
Until about two hundred years ago, almost everyone faced the prospect of a life that was poor, nasty, brutish, and short, with few if any prospects for betterment. For example, in today s money, annual average per-capita income during the first millennium was constant at about $500. And most of the next century saw little in the way of expanded opportunities. Indeed, until the early nineteenth century, annual average per-capita income was only a couple of hundred dollars higher, and the average per-capita growth rate barely increased above zero.
Why have societies so...
Until about two hundred years ago, almost everyone faced the prospect of a life that was poor, nasty, brutish, and short, with few if any prospects...
