The United States took almost a decade after Hiroshima and Nagasaki to develop a coherent strategy of nuclear deterrence. This comprehensive study by two careful and well-informed historians provides the best explanation we have of why this process took so long; it also suggests the inherent difficulties of relying on nuclear weapons to provide security in the first place. Required reading for anyone interested in the early history of the nuclear era.

From the foreword: "Established during World War II to advise the President on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council is essential to an understanding of the current work of the Chairman and the Joint Staff. A history of their activities, both in war and peacetime, also provides...

From the foreword: "Established during World War II to advise the President on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council is essential to an understanding of the current work of the Chairman and the Joint Staff. A history of their activities, both in war and peacetime, also provides...

The United States took almost a decade after Hiroshima and Nagasaki to develop a coherent strategy of nuclear deterrence. it also suggests the inherent difficulties of relying on nuclear weapons to provide security in the first place.