This controversial set of essays evaluates and extends international relations theory in light of the revolutionary events of past years. The contributors demonstrate how theoretical constructs did not anticipate Soviet foreign policies that led to the end of the Cold War.

This is a collection of essays by Richard Ned Lebow, one of the leading scholars of international relations and US Foreign Policy. Lebow's work has centered on the instrumental value of ethics in foreign policy decision making and the disasterous consequences which follow when ethical standard are flouted.

"Coercion, Cooperation and Ethics in International Relations "brings together the recent essays of, Richard Ned Lebow, one of the leading scholars of international relations and U.S. Foreign Policy. Lebow's work has centered on the instrumental value of ethics in foreign policy decision making and the disastrous consequences which follow when ethical standard are flouted. Unlike most realists who have considered ethical considerations irrelevant in states' calculations of their national interest, Lebow has argued that self interest, and hence, national interest can only be formulated...

What if the Persians had won at Salamis? What if Christ had not been crucified? What if the Chinese had harnessed steam power before the West? Disparaged by some as a mere parlor game, counterfactual history is seen by others as an indispensable historical tool. Taking as their point of inquiry the debate over the inevitability of the rise of the West, the eminent scholars in Unmaking the West argue that there is no escaping counterfactual history. Whenever we make claims of cause and effect, we commit ourselves to the assumption that if key links in the causal chain were broken,...

Drawing on recently declassified documents and extensive interviews with Soviet and American policy-makers, among them several important figures speaking for public record for the first time, Ned Lebow and Janice Stein cast new light on the effect of nuclear threats in two of the tensest moments of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the confrontations arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. They conclude that the strategy of deterrence prolonged rather than ended the conflict between the superpowers.

When is war is the result of a nation's deliberate decision to advance its vital interests by force of arms? When is it brought about by miscalculation? What causes policy-makers to misjudge the consequences of their actions? This book takes up these and other questions in a comparative study of the origins, politics, and outcomes of international crisis based on data from 27 historical cases.

Now available in paperback, Psychology and Deterrence reveals deterrence strategy's hidden and generally simplistic assumptions about the nature of power and aggression, threat and response, and calculation and behavior in the international arena.

For sixty years, different groups in Europe have put forth interpretations of World War II and their respective countries roles in it consistent with their own political and psychological needs. The conflict over the past has played out in diverse arenas, including film, memoirs, court cases, and textbooks. It has had profound implications for democratization and relations between neighboring countries. This collection provides a comparative case study of how memories of World War II have been constructed and revised in seven European nations: France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Poland,...

Although in hindsight the end of the Cold War seems almost inevitable, almost no one saw it coming and there is little consensus over why it ended. A popular interpretation is that the Soviet Union was unable to compete in terms of power, especially in the area of high technology. Another interpretation gives primacy to the new ideas Gorbachev brought to the Kremlin and to the importance of leaders and domestic considerations. In this volume, prominent experts on Soviet affairs and the Cold War interrogate these competing interpretations in the context of five 'turning points' in the end of...

Although in hindsight the end of the Cold War seems almost inevitable, almost no one saw it coming and there is little consensus over why it ended. A popular interpretation is that the Soviet Union was unable to compete in terms of power, especially in the area of high technology. Another interpretation gives primacy to the new ideas Gorbachev brought to the Kremlin and to the importance of leaders and domestic considerations. In this volume, prominent experts on Soviet affairs and the Cold War interrogate these competing interpretations in the context of five 'turning points' in the end of...