This new study challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred, maintaining that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward so-called 'rogue states' and terror groups.

James Lebovic argues that deterrence principles continue to apply, and focuses upon the 'three pillars' of the Bush administration's national security policy:

• missile defence, which preoccupied the administration until September 11, 2001
• pre-emption, which became the US focus with the September...

This new study challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred, maintaining that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward so-called 'rogue states' and terror groups.

James Lebovic argues that deterrence principles continue to apply, and focuses upon the 'three pillars' of the Bush administration's national security policy:

• missile defence, which preoccupied the administration until September 11, 2001
• pre-emption, which became the US focus with the September...

Political scientist James H. Lebovic establishes that the size, strength, flexibility, and adaptability of the U.S. military cannot ensure victory in asymmetrical conflicts.

In The Limits of U.S. Military Capability, Lebovic shows how political and psychological factors trumped U.S. military superiority in Vietnam and Iraq, where inappropriate strategies, low stakes, and unrealistic goals mired the United States military in protracted, no-win conflicts.

Lebovic contends that the United States is at a particular disadvantage when fighting a counterinsurgency without the...