A comparative investigation of how unions and firms interact when economic circumstances demand substantial job loss. Using simple game theory to generate testable propositions about when these situations will result in industrial conflict, the work illustrates the theory in a range of situations between 1950 and 1985 in Japan, Italy, and Britain. Additionally, the author shows how the theory explains why strikes over job loss almost never occur in postwar unionized firms in the United States.

Corruption regularly makes front page headlines: public officials embezzling government monies, selling public offices, and trading bribes for favors to private companies generate public indignation and calls for reform. In Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know(R), renowned scholars Ray Fisman and Miriam A. Golden provide a deeper understanding of why corruption is so damaging politically, socially, and economically. Among the key questions examined are: is corruption the result of perverse economic incentives? Does it stem from differences in culture and tolerance for illicit acts...