The main question addressed in this book is whether individuation of the contents of thoughts and linguistic expressions is inherently holistic. The authors consider the arguments that are alleged to show that the meaning of scientific hypothesis depends on the entire theory that entails it, or that the content of a concept depends on the entire belief system of which it is part. If these arguments are sound, then it would follow that the meaning of words, sentences, hypotheses, predictions, discourses, dialogues, texts, thoughts and the like are merely derivative. The implications of holism...

In a compelling defense of the speculative approach to the philosophy of mind, Jerry Fodor argues that, while our best current theories of cognitive psychology view many higher processes as computational, computation itself presupposes an internal medium of representation. Fodor's prime concerns are to buttress the notion of internal representation from a philosophical viewpoint, and to determine those characteristics of this conceptual construct using the empirical data available from linguistics and cognitive psychology.

Part of a series focusing on cognitive science, where various disciplines - psychology, linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, philosophy and computational theory - join forces in the investigation of thought, awareness, understanding, and associated workings of the mind. Each book aims to be accessible beyond the ranks of specialists, so as to reach an interdisciplinary and postgraduate readership. This volume focuses on concepts, exploring what concepts have to be and the demise of definitions.