The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to...

Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy and Free...

Beginning Philosophy provides an introduction to the fundamental philo sophical problems in a straight-forward, reader-friendly style. It cov ers logic and reasoning, theory of knowledge, the nature of the extern al world, the mind/body problem, ethics, free will, the existence of G od, and the problem of evil. It contains both extensive quotes from hi storical figures, such as Aquinas, Hume and Descartes, and references to some philosophical-minded, non-philosophers, such as Dostoevski and Carl Sagan.