Much of the most interesting and controversial work in analyzing democratic institutions over the recent past has its intellectual origins in public choice economics. The analytical apparatus derived for the study of human behavior in markets is applied to a political setting. The electoral process is viewed as a kind of market in which the currency is votes and party competition is the primary mechanism by which the policies that citizens want are ensured. This book explores the advantages and problems with democratic institutions in a series of essays representing a variety of disciplinary...
Much of the most interesting and controversial work in analyzing democratic institutions over the recent past has its intellectual origins in public c...
Do voters in large scale democracies reliably vote for the electoral outcomes most in their own interest? Much of the literature on voting predicts that they do, but this book argues that fully rational voters will not, in fact, consistently vote for the political outcomes they prefer. The authors critique the dominant interest-based theory of voting and offer a competing theory, which they term an "expressive" theory of electoral politics. This theory is shown to be more coherent and more consistent with actually observed voting behavior. In particular, the theory does a better job of...
Do voters in large scale democracies reliably vote for the electoral outcomes most in their own interest? Much of the literature on voting predicts th...
