This book presents a new nominalistic philosophy of mathematics: semantic conventionalism. Its central thesis is that mathematics should be founded on the human ability to create language – and specifically, the ability to institute conventions for the truth conditions of sentences.This philosophical stance leads to an alternative way of practicing mathematics: instead of “building” objects out of sets, a mathematician should introduce new syntactical sentence types, together with their truth conditions, as he or she develops a theory.Semantic conventionalism is justified first through...

This book presents Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and the other limitative results which are most significant for the philosophy of mathematics. Results are stated in the form most relevant for use in the philosophy of mathematics. An appendix considers their implications for Hilbert’s Program for the foundations of mathematics. The text is self-contained, all notions being explained in full detail, but of course previous exposure to the very first rudiments of mathematical logic will help.

This book presents an in-depth and critical reconstruction of Prawitz’s epistemic grounding, and discusses it within the broader field of proof-theoretic semantics. The theory of grounds is also provided with a formal framework, through which several relevant results are proved. Investigating Prawitz’s theory of grounds, this work answers one of the most fundamental questions in logic: why and how do some inferences have the epistemic power to compel us to accept their conclusion, if we have accepted their premises? Prawitz proposes an innovative description of inferential acts, as...

This book provides philosophers of science with new theoretical resources for making their own contributions to the scientific realism debate. Readers will encounter old and new arguments for and against scientific realism. They will also be given useful tips for how to provide influential formulations of scientific realism and antirealism. Finally, they will see how scientific realism relates to scientific progress, scientific understanding, mathematical realism, and scientific practice.

This monograph is a defence of the Fregean take on logic. The author argues that Frege´s projects, in logic and philosophy of language, are essentially connected and that the formalist shift produced by the work of Peano, Boole and Schroeder and continued by Hilbert and Tarski is completely alien to Frege's approach in theBegriffsschrift. A central thesis of the book is that judgeable contents, i.e. propositions, are the primary bearers of logical properties, which makes logic embedded in our conceptual system. This approach allows coherent and correct definitions of logical constants,...