This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.

This comprehensive study is the first scholarly account explaining how the British and Indian armies adapted to the peculiar demands of fighting an irregular tribal opponent in the mountainous no-man's-land between India and Afghanistan. It does so by discussing how a tactical doctrine of frontier fighting was developed and 'passed on' to succeeding generations of soldiers. As this book conclusively demonstrates this form of colonial warfare always exerted a powerful influence on the organisation, equipment, training and ethos of the Army in India.

Why, despite the appalling conditions in the trenches of the Western Front, was the British army almost untouched by major mutiny during the First World War? Drawing upon an extensive range of sources, including much previously unpublished archival material, G. D. Sheffield seeks to answer this question by examining a crucial but previously neglected factor in the maintenance of the British army's morale in the First World War: the relationship between the regimental officer and the ordinary soldier.

During the Second World War, British and Imperial forces captured more than half a million Italian soldiers, sailors and airmen. Although a symbol of military success, these prisoners created a multitude of problems for the authorities throughout the war. This book looks at how the British addressed these problems and turned liabilities into assets by using the Italians as a labour force, a source of military intelligence and as a political warfare tool before their final repatriation in 1946-47.

This collection of essays reviews the politico-military relationship between Britain and France between the two World Wars. As well as examining the relationship between the two nations' armed services, the book's contributors also analyse key themes in Anglo-French inter-war defence politics - disarmament, intelligence and imperial defence - and joint military, political and economic preparations for a second world war.

This book argues that postwar Britain's 'imperial over-extension' has been exaggerated. Britain developed and adjusted its defence strategy based upon the perceived Communist threat and available resources. It was especially successful at adapting to meet the strategic and resource challenges from the Far East from 1947-54. There British and Gurkha forces were deployed only in contingencies that threatened vital British interests, while the U.S. and Commonwealth allies were persuaded to accept key wartime missions, thus preserving Britain's ability to fight in Western Europe.

This is the first full-length study of the role played by British Intelligence in influencing policy towards Japan from the decline of the Alliance to the outbreak of the Pacific War. Using many previously classified records it describes how the image of Japan generated by Intelligence during this period led Britain to underestimate Japanese military capabilities in 1941. The book shows how this image was derived from a lack of adequate intelligence resources and racially driven assumptions about Japanese national characteristics.

By examining Mauritius and the Indian Ocean, this unique synthesis of imperial and naval/military history, reveals the depths of colonial involvement in the Second World War and the role of colonies in British strategic planning from the eighteenth century. In the century of total war, the British Empire was fully mobilized. The Mauritian home front became regimented, troops were recruited for service overseas, the Eastern fleet guarded the Indian Ocean, and Mauritius became a base for SOE operations and intelligence-gathering for Bletchley.

Focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. This book combines a narrative of diplomatic events and policy making with the analysis of naval intelligence and war planning.

Leonard Seabrooke argues that the key to understanding change in international finance since the 1960s rests with US structural power. He demonstrates how the US promotion of direct financing has encouraged Britain, Japan, and Germany to catch up to US-led innovations.