The likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters' preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters' preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise...

This book includes up-to-date contributions in the broadly defined area of probabilistic analysis of voting rules and decision mechanisms. Featuring papers from all fields of social choice and game theory, it presents probability arguments to allow readers to gain a better understanding of the properties of decision rules and of the functioning of modern democracies. In particular, it focuses on the legacy of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley, two prominent scholars who have made important contributions to this field over the last fifty years. It covers a range of topics, including...

This textbook is Volume 1 of a two-volume set on the axiomatics of economic design. Its central argument is that economic institutions are not God-given: they are man-made. Their ultimate goal is to promote social welfare. The book describes the axiomatic approach to design. It consists in the formulation of criteria of desirability of solution mappings, and of the examination of their logical implications when imposed in various combinations. Its goal is to identify as precisely as possible the line that separates those combinations of desiderata that are compatible and those that are...