A Chance for Possibility defends the view that the objective modal realm is tripartite: truths about possible worlds supervene on modal truths, which in turn supervene on truths about objective chances.
An understanding of supervenience in terms of grounding is developed which -- unlike the standard modal characterization -- allows the question of what modal truths supervene on to have a non-trivial answer. Relying on this understanding, a negative result is established: modal truths do not supervene on truths about possible worlds, whether possible worlds are conceived of as...

The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as inaugurated by Brentano and worked out in a very sophisticated way by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. Their criticism is, in the epistemological regard, directed against introspectionism, and in the ontological regard, against an internalist and qualia-friendly, non-functionalist (or: broadly dualistic/idealistic) conception of the mind. The book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle,...

The present volume investigates the legacy of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein in contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics. These philosophers inspired both the development of analytic philosophy and various philosophical approaches to the study of language. They have influenced technical discussions on truth, proper names, definite descriptions, propositions and predication, sense and reference, truth, and philosophical and linguistic inquiries into the relations between language, mind and the world. The studies gathered in this volume discuss most of...

The series provides a forum for innovative, high-quality work in all fields of analytical philosophy. The volumes in this series are published in either English or German.

Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987) was, arguably, one of the greatest ontologists of the twentieth century. In 2006 and 2007, after a period of relative neglect, international conferences devoted solely to Bergmann's work were held at the University of Iowa in the USA, Universite de Provence in France, and Universita degli Studi di Roma Tre in Italy. The fifteen papers collected in this volume were presented at the third of these conferences, in Rome, and are here divided into three sections: "Categories of a realistic ontology," "World, mind, and relations," "Metaphysics of space and time."

The series provides a forum for innovative, high-quality work in all fields of analytical philosophy. The volumes in this series are published in either English or German.

Interest in the age-old problems of universals and individuation has received a new impetus from the current revival of ontology in the analytic tradition, the development of theories of individual properties (and the related application of mereological calculi to the analysis of predication), and the particular problems posed by relational predication and the nature of particulars. The essays explore aspects of the history of the issues and attempt to deal with the issues and with challenges to the distinctions that give rise to them. They continue the debates stemming from the revival of...

This volume comprises original articles by leading authors - from philosophy as well as sociology - in the debate around relativism in the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. Its aim has been to bring together several threads from the relevant disciplines and to cover the discussion from historical and systematic points of view. Among the contributors are Maria Baghramian, Barry Barnes, Martin Endre, Hubert Knoblauch, Richard Schantz and Harvey Siegel.

The book discusses the fate of universality and a universal set in several set theories. The book aims at a philosophical study of ontological and conceptual questions around set theory. Set theories are ontologies. They posit sets and claim that these exhibit the essential properties laid down in the set theoretical axioms. Collecting these postulated entities quantified over poses the problem of universality. Is the collection of the set theoretical entities itself a set theoretical entity? What does it mean if it is, and what does it mean if it is not? To answer these questions involves...