Matters of Mind examines the mind-body problem. It offers a chapter by chapter analysis of debates surrounding the problem, including visual experience, consciousness and the problem of Zombies and Ghosts. It will prove invaluable for those interested in epistemology, philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

This text covers topical areas in the mind-body problem. It shows how the problem has changed from the earlier theories of reduction to the dominant empirical cases for materialism. The author puts forward the argument that most positions are overdrawn, and that most hard-line views about materialism and dualism are unfounded. The various debates surrounding the mind-body problem, including visual experience, consciousness, content and reason, reliabilism and the problem of zombies and ghosts are also analyzed. The book should appeal to those interested in epistemology, the philosophy of...

Reissue from the classic Muirhead Library of Philosophy series (originally published between 1890s - 1970s).

Since the time of Bacon, Galileo and Descartes, philosophers have identified strongly with the aims of natural science and the rationality of its methods. This is an in-depth study of scientism, the belief that science is the best and most important branch of learning. Although the text does not seek to denigrate science, it is critical of the scientistic tendency in philosophy and argues that the arts and humanities are undervalued. This book insists that philosophy is not science and condemns recent attempts in the name of naturalism to revive the project of scientific philosophy.

Franz Brentano (1838-1917) was a key figure in the development of 20th-century thought, influencing the work of philosophers such as Edmund Husserl. This work presents a series of lectures given by Brentano in 1887. It also provides a concise introduction which places Brentano within the history of philosophy and psychology and locates his influence in contemporary thought.

Do we really know the things we think we know? Are any of our beliefs reasonable? Scepticism gives a pessimistic reply to these important epistemological questions - we don't know anything; none of our beliefs are reasonable. But can such a seemingly paradoxical claim be more than an intellectual curiousity? And if it is, can it be refuted? Ruth Weintraub answers yes to both these questions.
The sceptical challenge is a formidable one, and should be confronted, not dismissed. The theoretical and practical difficulties it presents - in that the sceptical life cannot be lived, and the...

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.