This investigation proposes a conceptual framework for measurement necessary for an analysis of household finance and economic development.

Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design....

Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at Universite Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title, Repeated Games, which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and...

This book examines situations in which empirical observations are consistent or inconsistent with some of the best known economic theories.

This second volume includes papers presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, addressing topics such as big data, macroeconomics, financial markets, and partially identified models.

This first volume includes papers presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, addressing topics such as dynamic mechanism design, agency problems, and networks.

This book provides an introduction to Suzanne Scotchmer's contributions to the economics of innovation, intellectual property incentives, and equilibrium theory.