By approaching an important foreign policy issue from a new angle, Jonathan Mercer comes to a startling, controversial discovery: a nation's reputation is not worth fighting for. He presents the most comprehensive examination to date of what defines a reputation when it is likely to emerge in international politics, and with what consequences. Mercer examines reputation formation in a series of crises before World War I. He tests competing arguments, one from deterrence theory, the other from social psychology, to see which better predicts and explains how reputations form. He extends his...
By approaching an important foreign policy issue from a new angle, Jonathan Mercer comes to a startling, controversial discovery: a nation's reputatio...
What causes war? How can military conflicts best be prevented? The author of this volume frames five conditions that increase the risk of interstate war: false optimism about the likely outcome of a war; first-strike advantage; fluctuation in the relative power of states; circumstances that allow nations to parlay one conquest into another; and circumstances that make conquest easy. Van Evera argues that all but one of these conditions - false optimism - rarely occur today, but policy-makers often erroneously believe in their existence. He demonstrates that these misperceptions are...
What causes war? How can military conflicts best be prevented? The author of this volume frames five conditions that increase the risk of interstate w...
The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine.
Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world...
The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was ...
Whole World on Fire focuses on a technical riddle wrapped in an organizational mystery: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S. government fail to predict nuclear fire damage as it drew up plans to fight strategic nuclear war?U.S. bombing in World War II caused massive fire damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but later war plans took account only of damage from blast; they completely ignored damage from atomic firestorms. Recently a small group of researchers has shown that for modern nuclear weapons the destructiveness and lethality of nuclear mass fire often and predictably...
Whole World on Fire focuses on a technical riddle wrapped in an organizational mystery: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S. govern...
Following the Allied victory in World War II, the United States turned its efforts to preventing the spread of Communism beyond Eastern Europe. Gregory Mitrovich argues, however, that the policy of containment was only the first step in a clandestine campaign to destroy Soviet power. Drawing on recently declassified U.S. documents, Mitrovich reveals a range of previously unknown covert actions launched during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Through the aggressive use of psychological warfare, officials sought to provoke political crisis among key Soviet leaders, to incite...
Following the Allied victory in World War II, the United States turned its efforts to preventing the spread of Communism beyond Eastern Europe. Gre...
One of the most important questions of human existence is what drives nations to war especially massive, system-threatening war. Much military history focuses on the who, when, and where of war. In this riveting book, Dale C. Copeland brings attention to bear on why governments make decisions that lead to, sustain, and intensify conflicts.
Copeland presents detailed historical narratives of several twentieth-century cases, including World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. He highlights instigating factors that transcend individual personalities, styles of government, geography,...
One of the most important questions of human existence is what drives nations to war especially massive, system-threatening war. Much military hist...
Since the unprecedentedly effective performance of the allied air campaign against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, the role of American air power in future wars has become a topic of often heated public debate. In this balanced appraisal of air power's newly realized strengths in joint warfare, Benjamin Lambeth, a defense analyst and civilian pilot who has flown in most of the equipment described in this book, explores the extent to which the United States can now rely on air-delivered precision weapons in lieu of ground forces to achieve strategic objectives and minimize American...
Since the unprecedentedly effective performance of the allied air campaign against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, the role of American air power ...
James McAllister outlines a new account of early Cold War history, one that focuses on the emergence of a bipolar structure of power, the continuing importance of the German question, and American efforts to create a united Western Europe. Challenging the conventional wisdom among both international relations theorists and Cold War historians, McAllister argues that America's central objective from the Second World War to the mid-1950s was to create a European order that could be peaceful and stable without requiring the permanent presence of American ground forces on the...
James McAllister outlines a new account of early Cold War history, one that focuses on the emergence of a bipolar structure of power, the continuin...
Between the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, the United States was embroiled in competitive inter-state politics. Although it did not directly involve itself in European affairs, the United States did engage regularly in dangerous struggles with other states and with colonial powers with territory on the American periphery. Aside from the War of 1812, the Oregon Crisis, and the Mexican War, other "near misses" included here disputes of 1807 and 1809 with Britain, with Spain over East Florida in 1811 13, with Mexico in 1853, and disputes with Spain over Cuba in 1853 55 and with Mexico in...
Between the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, the United States was embroiled in competitive inter-state politics. Although it did not directly inv...
