An international group of specialists from the fields of law, politics, economics, and philosophy address the question of why governments act or do not act according to laws. The authors interpret the rule of law as a strategic choice of actors with powerful interests, rather than as an exogenous constraint on politicians. The rule of law emerges when no group is strong enough to dominate the others, and political actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to law. Law is thus deeply rooted in politics.

It is sometimes assumed that voting is the central mechanism for political decision making. The contributors to this volume focus on an alternative mechanism, which is decision by discussion or deliberation. This volume is characterized by a realistic approach to the issue of deliberative democracy. Rather than assuming that deliberative democracy is always ideal, the authors critically probe its limits and weaknesses as well as its strengths.

This book examines whether mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses,...

An international group of specialists from the fields of law, politics, economics, and philosophy address the question of why governments act or do not act according to laws. The authors interpret the rule of law as a strategic choice of actors with powerful interests, rather than as an exogenous constraint on politicians. The rule of law emerges when no group is strong enough to dominate the others, and political actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to law. Law is thus deeply rooted in politics.

Since ancient Athens, democrats have taken pride in their power and inclination to change their laws, yet they have also sought to counter this capacity by creating immutable laws. In Democracy and Legal Change, Melissa Schwartzberg argues that modifying law is a fundamental and attractive democratic activity. Against those who would defend the use of entrenchment clauses to protect key constitutional provisions from revision, Schwartzberg seeks to demonstrate historically the strategic and even unjust purposes unamendable laws have typically served, and to highlight the regrettable...

This book contributes to debates in positive democratic theory about accountability and representation. It bridges the gap between formal models and theoretically weak empirical analyses. The chapters stay close to the results of the formal literature, but they provide a more realistic description of how the democratic control of governments operates. The book studies the many obstacles that citizens face to hold governments accountable: (1) voters combine judgments of past performance with other considerations such as ideological or ethnic criteria; (2) parties in office may limit the...

Since ancient Athens, democrats have taken pride in their power and inclination to change their laws, yet they have also sought to counter this capacity by creating immutable laws. In Democracy and Legal Change, Melissa Schwartzberg argues that modifying law is a fundamental and attractive democratic activity. Against those who would defend the use of entrenchment clauses to protect key constitutional provisions from revision, Schwartzberg seeks to demonstrate historically the strategic and even unjust purposes unamendable laws have typically served, and to highlight the regrettable...

The book analyzes the sources of widespread dissatisfaction with democracies around the world and identifies directions for feasible reforms.

It is widely believed that autocratic regimes cannot limit their power through institutions of their own making. This book presents a surprising challenge to this view. It demonstrates that the Chilean armed forces were constrained by institutions of their own design. Based on extensive documentation of military decision-making, much of it long classified and unavailable, this book reconstructs the politics of institutions within the recent Chilean dictatorship (1973-1990).

Supermajority rules govern many features of our lives in common: from the selection of textbooks for our children's schools to residential covenants, from the policy choices of state and federal legislatures to constitutional amendments. It is usually assumed that these rules are not only normatively unproblematic but necessary to achieve the goals of institutional stability, consensus, and minority protections. In this book, Melissa Schwartzberg challenges the logic underlying the use of supermajority rule as an alternative to majority decision making. She traces the hidden history of...