Richard Jeffrey is beyond dispute one of the most distinguished and influential philosophers working in the field of decision theory and the theory of knowledge. His work is distinctive in showing the interplay of epistemological concerns with probability and utility theory. Not only has he made use of standard probabilistic and decision theoretic tools to clarify concepts of evidential support and informed choice, he has also proposed significant modifications of the standard Bayesian position in order that it provide a better fit with actual human experience. Probability logic is viewed not...

In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers, and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation, and...

This is an important collection of essays on dealing with the foundations of probability that will be of value to philosophers of science, mathematicians, statisticians, psychologists and educationalists. The collection falls into three parts: Part I comprises five essays on the axiomatic foundations of probability. Part II contains seven articles on probabilistic causality and quantum mechanics, with an emphasis on the existence of hidden variables. The third part consists of a single extended essay applying probabilistic theories of learning to practical questions of education: it...

This is a collection of essays on the relation between probabilities--especially conditional probabilities--and conditionals. It provides new negative results that sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results that will open up new areas of research. The collection is intended to honor Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams's work, the contributions extend his ideas in directions he may not have anticipated,...

Foundational issues in statistical mechanics and the more general question of how probability is to be understood in the context of physical theories are both areas that have been neglected by philosophers of physics. This book fills an important gap in the literature by providing the most systematic study to date of how to interpret probabilistic assertions in the context of statistical mechanics. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers of science, physicists and mathematicians interested in foundational issues, and also to historians of science.

Causation is asymmetrical in many different ways. Causes precede effects; explanations cite causes not effects. Agents use causes to manipulate their effects; they don't use effects to manipulate their causes. Effects of a common cause are correlated; causes of a common effect are not. This book by one of the preeminent philosophers of science writing today offers the most comprehensive account available of causal asymmetries. It is a major book for philosophers of science that will also prove insightful to economists and statisticians.

In Decision Space: Multidimensional Utility Analysis, Paul Weirich increases the power and versatility of utility analysis and in the process advances decision theory. Combining traditional and novel methods of option evaluation into one systematic method, multidimensional utility analysis is a valuable new tool. The multiple dimensions of this analysis create a decision space broad enough to accommodate all factors affecting an option's utility. The book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the subject of decision theory, as well as to economists and other...

The essays in this book develop and explore the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. The author establishes principles for distinguishing options in decision problems and pays much attention to games--both isolated and iterated. The book also views critically Gauthier's revisionist ideas about maximizing rationality.

This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers a new conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This new conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful new way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.

This important collection of essays is a synthesis of foundational studies in Bayesian decision theory and statistics. An overarching topic of the collection is understanding how the norms for Bayesian decision making should apply in settings with more than one rational decision maker and then tracing out some of the consequences of this turn for Bayesian statistics. The volume will be particularly valuable to philosophers concerned with decision theory, probability, and statistics, statisticians, mathematicians, and economists.