This is a book about some of the basic concepts of metaphysics: universals, particulars, causality, and possibility. Its aim is to give an account of the real constituents of the world. The author defends a realistic view of universals, characterizing the notion of universal by considering language and logic, possibility, hierarchies of universals, and causation. On the other hand, he argues that logic and language are not reliable guides to the nature of reality. All assertions and predications about the natural world are ultimately founded on "basic universals," which are the fundamental...

Scientific Essentialism defends the view that the fundamental laws of nature depend on the essential properties of the things on which they are said to operate, and are therefore not independent of them. These laws are not imposed upon the world by God, the forces of nature, or anything else, but rather are immanent in the world. Ellis argues that ours is a dynamic world consisting of more or less transient objects that are constantly interacting with each other, and whose identities depend on their roles in these processes. The laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, and consequently,...

Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology--that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its parts. Using Plato's Meno as a starting point, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that it is less valuable than generally assumed. The book will appeal to students and professional philosophers in epistemology.

H. P. Grice's theory of implicature provides the leading paradigm for research in pragmatics. Wayne Davis argues controversially that Gricean theory does not work. In developing his argument the author explains that the psycho-social principles actually define the social function of implicature conventions, which contribute to the satisfaction of those principles. By offering a searching and systematic critique of one of the established doctrines in the philosophy of language, this challenging book will be of particular importance to philosophers of language and linguists, especially those...

Portraying the mind as a two-level structure, this book analyzes the architecture of the human mind. Thus, it demonstrates that the mind consists of a basic mind and a supermind--the former non-conscious and non-linguistic, the latter conscious and language-involving. Claiming that philosophers and psychologists have failed to distinguish these levels, Keith Frankish argues that this failure has stood in the way of the successful explanation of a number of puzzling mental phenomena. His book will be valued by philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists.

How do we form and modify our beliefs about the world? While accepting that what we believe is determined by evidence, and therefore is not directly under our control, Professor Helm argues that no theory of knowledge is complete without standards for accepting and rejecting evidence as belief-worthy. These standards, or belief-policies, are not themselves determined by evidence, but determine what counts as credible evidence. Unlike single beliefs, Helm argues, belief-policies are directly subject to the will, and consequently to weakness of will and self-deception. Helm reveals the...

The principal aim of this book is to develop and defend an analysis of the concept of moral obligation. What it seeks to do is generate new solutions to a range of philosophical problems concerning obligation and its application. Among these problems are deontic paradoxes, the supersession of obligation, conditional obligation, actualism and possibilism, dilemmas, supererogation, and cooperation. By virtue of its normative neutrality, the analysis provides a theoretical framework within which competing theories of obligation can be developed and assessed.

What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is nonintentional. In this study, Annette Barnes offers a challenge to both the standard characterization of the deception of others and current characterizations of self-deception, examining the available explanations and exploring such questions as the self-deceiver's false consciousness, bias, and the...

This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics represents a systematic effort to clarify, deepen, and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states; principally, thoughts and ideas; and that meaning consists in their expression. This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean program, explaining the significance of words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and for a speaker to mean something in terms of intention. Grice's own formulations are rejected, and alternatives are developed.