The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies

ISBN-13: 9780521581011 / Angielski / Twarda / 1997 / 384 str.

New York) David L. Weimer (University of Rochester

Opis

The Political Economy of Property Rights investigates the transformation of property rights in post-communist countries and China. The movement to effective market economies requires the creation of more effective supporting institutions, especially systems of property rights that decentralize the control of economic resources. This process is inherently political, and thus should be studied from the perspective of political economy.

Recenzje

"This volume examines why the countries have followed the policy courses that they did. Weimer describes the basic principles of property rights, in particular, security against appropriation by others, emphasizes the close connection between private property and democracy, and then summarizes the other contributions. ...a major step toward developing such a full model, as it confronts the modesl with many empirical cases. We can then see what data and techiniques are most successful in testin the theory." Kenneth Koford, Journal of Comparative Economics

Spis treści

1. The political economy of property rights David L. Weimer; 2. Credible commitment and property rights: the role of strategic interaction between political and economic actors Daniel Diermeier, Joel Ericson, Timothy Frye, and Steven Lewis; 3. The political commitment to markets and marketization: comment on 'Credible commmitment and property rights' Barry R. Weingast; 4. Political determinants of the success of economic transition Nikolai Mikhailov; 5. Comment on 'Political determinants of the success of economic transition' Adam Przeworski; 6. Russian privatization and the problem of credible commitment Timothy Frye; 7. Three issues of credible commitment and Russian privatization John M. Litwack; 8. Legislative politics and the political economy of property rights in post-Communist Russia Brendan Kiernan and Francis X. Bell; 9. Commitment, coordination, and the demise of the post-Communist parliament in Russia Steven S. Smith; 10. Private firms, city governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St. Petersburg Jole Meyer Ericson; 11. Comment on 'Private firms, city governments, and arbitration: enforcing economic legality in St. Petersburg' Anthony Jones; 12. Property rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovac Republics Mariusz Mark Dobek; 13. Comment on 'Property rights and institutional change in the Czech and Slovac Republics' Sharon Wolchik; 14. Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization bargains in Poland Lorene Allio; 15. Comment on 'Institutional structures, labor interests, and evolving privatization bargains in Poland' Bartlomeij Kaminski; 16. Privatization as institutional change in Hungary László Urbán; 17. Comment on 'Privatization as institutional change in Hungary' Kálmán Mizsei; 18. Marketization and government credibility in Shanghai: federalist and local corporatist explanations Steven Lewis; 19. Federalist and corporatist theories: a comment on an empirical test Victor Nee; 20. Learning about the economy: property rights and the collapse of the East German industrial economy Hannes Wittig; 21. Misinformation, insecure property rights, and the collapse of the East German economy Susanne Lohmann; 22. Post-Communist privatization as a test of theories of institutional change Lorene Allio, Mariusz Mark Dobek, Nikolia Mikhailov, and David L. Weimer; 23. Explaining the complexity of institutional change Jack Knight and Douglass C. North.