Wittgenstein and Pragmatism: On Certainty in the Light of Peirce and James

ISBN-13: 9781137588463 / Angielski / Twarda / 2016 / 311 str.

Anna Boncompagni

Opis

This book investigates the conflicts concerning pragmatism inWittgenstein's work On Certainty, through a comparison with thepragmatist tradition as expressed by its founding fathers Charles S. Peirceand William James. It also describes Wittgenstein's first encounters withpragmatism in the 1930s and shows the relevance of Frank Ramsey in thedevelopment of his thought. Offering a balanced, critical and theoreticalexamination the author discusses issues such as doubt, certainty, commonsense, forms of life, action and the pragmatic maxim. While highlightingthe objective convergences and divergences between the two approaches, the volume makes links to ongoing debates on relativism, foundationalism, scepticism and objectivity. It will be of interest to anyone searching for newperspectives on Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Recenzje

"It would be interesting to see how Wittgenstein's unique style can be derived from a theory-neutral perspective that is perhaps more pragmatic than what was offered by the pragmatists, insofar as it is committed to no theory except to the extent that it helps us to avoid confusions." (Cayla Clinkenbeard, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, Vol. 39 (2), 2019)

Spis treści

Foreword

Acknowledgments

List of Abbreviations

 

Introduction. ‘A kind of Weltanschauung’

 

Part I – Before On Certainty

 

Chapter 1. Pragmatism in Wittgenstein before On Certainty

1.1 Preliminary remarks

1.2 ‘Die pragmatistiche Auffassung von Wahr und Falsch’

1.3 Wittgenstein and Ramsey

1.4 Wittgenstein reader of James

1.5 Wittgenstein reader of Peirce?

1.6 Other references to pragmatism before On Certainty

1.7 Concluding remarks

 

Part II – On Certainty

 

Chapter 2. Reasonable doubts and unshakable certainties

2.1 Preliminary remarks

2.2 Doubt

2.3 Skepticism and fallibilism

2.4 Wittgenstein’s ‘hinges’

2.5 Peirce’s ‘indubitables’ and ‘regulative assumptions’

2.6 Concluding remarks

 

Chapter 3. Common sense and Weltbild

3.1 Preliminary remarks

3.2 Peirce’s critical common sensism and James’ ‘mother-tongue of thought’

3.3 Wittgenstein’s Weltbild

3.4 Outlines for a comparison

3.5 Concluding remarks

 

Chapter 4. Action and the pragmatic maxim

4.1 Preliminary remarks

4.2 The pragmatic maxim

4.3 Perception and conduct, truth and belief

4.4 Meaning and consequences: the ‘Pragmatist Week’

4.5 Meaning and understanding

4.6 ‘Im Anfang war die Tat’

4.7 Action and its surroundings

4.8 Concluding remarks

 

Part III – Broadening the Perspective

 

Chapter 5. From ground to background

5.1 Preliminary remarks

5.2 Forms of life in Wittgenstein’s writings

5.3 Secondary literature: relativism and other issues

5.4 A human objectivity

5.5 Background and foreground

5.6 Concluding remarks

 

Chapter 6. Between method and Weltanschauung

6.1 Preliminary remarks

6.2 ‘The good in pragmatism’

6.3 Beyond method

6.4 Synoptic presentation and Weltanschauung

6.5 The river and the river-bed

6.6. Science and philosophy

6.7 Concluding remarks

 

Conclusion. ‘I’ll teach you differences’

Bibliography

Index

O autorze

Anna Boncompagni (University of California, Irvine) works mainly on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and on pragmatism, and is also interested in phenomenology, the history of analytic philosophy, and the philosophy of psychiatry. Her previous publications include “Elucidating Forms of Life: The Evolution of a Philosophical Tool”, Nordic Wittgenstein Review (2015) and Wittgenstein: Lo Sguardo e il Limite (2012).