Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement

ISBN-13: 9781405102421 / Angielski / Miękka / 2003 / 200 str.

Michael Luntley

Opis

In this important study, Michael Luntley offers a compelling reading of Wittgenstein's account of meaning and intentionality, based upon a unifying theme in the early and later philosophies.

• A compelling reading of Wittgenstein's account of meaning and intentionality.
  
• Offers an important and original reading of Wittgenstein's key texts.
  
• Based upon a unifying theme in Wittgenstein's early and later philosophies.

Recenzje

"The largely moribund state of current Wittgenstein scholarship ought to be radically changed for the better by this conspicuously interesting and insightful book." Alan Thomas, Philosophical Books

"Michael Luntley offers a striking interpretation of Wittgenstein′s philosophy, one aimed at displaying and defending Wittgenstein′s positive contribution in the later work. The result is a theory of the conditions for the possibility of intentionality, a theory that identifies the subject as agent in the world with that condition. Powerfully argued, this interesting and original treatment of Wittgenstein′s later philosophy raises a challenge for all of us who find a social dimension in Wittgenstein′s account of intentionality and normativity." Meredith Williams, The Johns Hopkins University <!––end––>

"Luntley provides an intriguing discussion of Wittgenstein′s early work, arbitrating judiciously between realist readings that emphasise the place of reference in its account of language, and non–realist readings that emphasise inference." Daniel Whiting, University of Reading, Philosophical Investigations 28/4, October 2005

Spis treści

Preface vii

Abbreviations ix

1 Wittgenstein’s Master Argument 1

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 Animating Signs 2

1.3 The Platonist Source of Grammar 9

1.4 The Cartesian Source of Grammar 11

1.5 The Community Source of Grammar 15

1.6 The Negative and Positive Phases – First Statement 16

2 Realism, Language and Self 21

2.1 Introduction 21

2.2 Logic Takes Care of Itself 22

2.3 The Need for Grammar 27

2.4 The Metaphysical Options 34

2.5 The Self 42

3 This is How We Play the Game 48

3.1 Introduction 48

3.2 Two Kinds of ‘Hidden’ 50

3.3 Meaning and Use 58

3.4 Use and Self 64

3.5 Use and Augustine’s Mistake 67

3.6 Is ‘Slab!’ a Shortening of ‘Bring Me a Slab!’or is the Latter a Lengthening of the Former? 71

3.7 This and Similar Things are called ‘Games’ 77

3.8 Spontaneity in Particular Circumstances 83

4 Rules and Other People 93

4.1 Introduction 93

4.2 The Structure of an Argument 94

4.3 The Bipartite Account of Meaning 100

4.4 Practice 105

4.5 What You See/Hear is not Normless 115

4.6 Seeing the Similarity in Particular Cases 119

5 Putting Your Self in the Picture 124

5.1 Introduction 124

5.2 The Standard Treatments 124

5.3 What’s Special about Sensations? 128

5.4 The Need for Calibration 133

5.5 Calibration in Subjectivity 137

5.6 Agreement in Forms of Life 142

5.7 ‘Inner’ Life Out There 146

5.8 Now I Understand 148

6 Seeing Things Aright 152

6.1 Introduction 152

6.2 Two Uses of the Word ‘See’ 155

6.3 See What I Mean 165

6.4 Paying Attention 168

6.5 The Place of Judgement 170

6.6 What Comes Natural 173

Bibliography 177

Index 182

O autorze

Michael Luntley is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. His previous publications include Language, Logic and Experience (1988), Reason, Truth and Self (1995) and Contemporary Philosophy of Thought (Blackwell, 1999).

Blurb

In this important study, Michael Luntley offers a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and intentionality, based upon a unifying theme in the early and later philosophies.

Rejecting readings which see a complete break between the Philosophical Investigations and the Tractatus, as well as views of Wittgenstein’s mature work which either lament or champion his anti–philosophical ‘quietism’, Luntley argues that Wittgenstein’s abiding concern was to show that the conditions for the possibility of intentionality consist not in a body of theoretical knowledge, but in perceptual knowledge, in our active capacity to ‘see things aright’.