Why It's Ok Not to Think for Yourself

ISBN-13: 9781032438252 / Angielski

Jonathan Matheson

Opis

We tend to applaud those who think for themselves: the ever-curious student, for example, or the grownup who does her own research. Even as we’re applauding, however, we ourselves often don’t think for ourselves. This book argues that’s completely OK.

Spis treści

Chapter 1 Introduction

Keeping your House in Order

What is Thinking for Yourself?

Clarifying the Central Conclusion

Looking Ahead

Chapter 2 Believing (Just) Because Others Believe: Epistemic Surrogates

From Individual to Social Epistemology

Believing the Experts & Epistemic Surrogacy

The Wisdom of Crowds

The Upshot

Chapter 3 The Argument from Expertise

Motivating the Argument

Applying the Argument

An Initial Worry: Identifying the Experts

The Upshot

Chapter 4 The Argument from Evidential Swamping

Motivating the Argument

Applying the Argument

The Upshot

Chapter 5 The Autonomy Objection

Motivating the Objection

The Myth of Intellectual Individualism

Autonomy as Intellectual Freedom

Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue

Wrap-Up

Chapter 6 The Free-Rider Objection

Motivating the Objection

The Cognitive Division of Labor

Epistemic Trespassing

The Wisdom of Crowds Again

Wrap-Up

Chapter 7 The Socratic Objection

Motivating the Objection

Normative Questions

No Relevant Experts

The Importance of Getting it Right

Moral Virtue

In Favor of Socratic Deference

Wrap-Up

Chapter 8 The Vulnerability Objection

Motivating the Objection

The Inevitability of Vulnerability

Vulnerability and Checks & Balances

The Importance of Institutions

Wrap-Up

Chapter 9 The Understanding Objection

Motivating the Objection

Understanding Without Thinking for Yourself

Setting the Scope

Epistemic Satisficing

Wrap-Up

Chapter 10 The Intellectual Virtue Objection

Motivating the Objection

Cultivating Intellectual Character Through Deference

Cartesian Epistemology & Social Epistemology

Social Intellectual Virtues

Wrap-Up

O autorze

Jonathan Matheson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Florida. His research interests are in epistemology, with a focus on issues concerning disagreement and epistemic autonomy. He has authored The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2015) and co-edited The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social (2014) with Rico Vitz and Epistemic Autonomy (2021) with Kirk Lougheed.