Web and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference, Wine 2015, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings

ISBN-13: 9783662489949 / Angielski / Miękka / 2015 / 442 str.

Evangelos Markakis; Guido Schafer

Opis

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015, held in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, in December 2015. The 30 regular papers presented together with 8 abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 142 submissions and cover results on incentives and computation in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.

Spis treści

Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations.- Price Competition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare.- Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing.- The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments.- Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction.- Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks.- New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem.- Ad Exchange: Envy-free Auctions with Mediators.- Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing Cost Functions.- On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games.- Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices.- Online Allocation and Pricing with Economies of Scale.- Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms.- Testing Consumer Rationality using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs.- Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games.- Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction.- Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities.- Applications of α-strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions.- The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing Games.- Adaptive Rumor Spreading.- Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games.- Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium.- Often Harder Than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets.- Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players.- The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling.- Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value of Money.- Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands.- Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation.- Inverse Game Theory: Learning Utilities in Succinct Games.- Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games.