Tinbergen Lectures on Organization Theory

ISBN-13: 9783642832758 / Angielski / Miękka / 2012 / 252 str.

Martin J. Beckmann;Jan Tinbergen

Opis

In revising the Tinbergen Lectures I have expanded and restructured the material in an attempt to make the book more readable and more interesting. I have also tried to show more clearly its relevance to managerial and organizational practice. Some mathematical derivations have been moved to appendices. Certain sections that may be skipped in a first reading have been starred. Points that should be of interest to management include the nature and necessity of rank (4. 1, 4. 2, 4. 4) rank assignment by counting up or down (4. 3) defining an organization's task (6. 2) calculating the required size of an organization (6. 3) allocating supervisors in the short run (6. 7) when uniform spans of control are desirable (6. 8) how to estimate an organization's implicit span of control (7) determining the minimal ranks in supervision (8. 3) the advantage of flexible department lines (8. 4) measuring the leanness of an organization (8. 5) the relationship between average wage and unit labor cost (10. 2) job allocation in the short run (10. 4) calculating the cost of supervision for particular jobs (10. 5) recognizing economic choices in substituting managers for operatives or vice versa (11) determining the optimal size of a research team (12) VI setting targets (13. 1) budgeting under full information (13. 2) budgeting under imperfect information (13. 3) sources of information loss (14."

Spis treści

1. Introduction.- 1.1 Organizations Defined.- 1.2 Why Economics of Organization?.- 1.3 Plan of This Book.- 1.4 Organizations and Their Environment.- I. Rank.- 2. Supervision.- 2.1 Content of Supervision.- 2.2 Structure of Supervision.- 2.3 A Directed Graph.- 2.4 Alternative Description.- 2.5 Organization Charts in Practice.- 3. Control.- 3.1 Structure.- 3.2 Control Sets.- 3.3 Partial Order.- 3.4 Further Remarks.- 4. Rank.- 4.1 Motivation.- 4.2 Simple Ordering.- 4.3 Counting Supervisory Relationships.- 4.4 Meaning of Rank.- 4.5 Rank and Precedence.- Problems.- 5. Distance.- 5.1 Organization Charts as Graphs.- 5.2 Communication Networks.- 5.3 Locating the President.- 5.4 Enumeration.- II. Perfect Management.- 6. Numbers of Positions.- 6.1 Span of Control.- 6.2 Quantification of Task.- 6.3 Constant Span of Control.- 6.4 Disaggregation of Task.- 6.5 Full-Time Assignments.- 6.6 Supervisory Load and Effort.- 6.7 Allocation of Managers in the Short Run.- 6.8 Average Span of Control and Output.- 6.9 Spans of Control Decreasing with Rank.- 7. Estimation.- 7.1 From M and Q.- 7.2 From Lists of Positions by Rank.- 7.3 Other Estimates.- 8. Assignment.- 8.1 The Problem of Implementation.- 8.2 Integer Assignments.- 8.3 Minimizing Ranks.- 8.4 Flexible or Rigid Department Lines.- 8.5 Leanness of Organizations.- 8.6 Support Structure.- Problems.- 9. Regular Organization.- 9.1 Construction.- 9.2 Properties.- 9.3 Average Rank.- 9.4 Average Distance.- 10. Costs.- 10.1 Salary Schedules.- 10.2 Average Wage and Unit Labor Cost.- 10.3 Cost Minimizing Organizational Designs.- 10.4 Job Allocation in the Short Run.- 10.5 Minimizing Unit Labor Costs.- 10.6 Cost and Scale for Regular Organizations.- 10.7 Cost and Scale for Nonregular Organizations.- III. Productivity and Structure.- 11. Substitution of Management and Operative Inputs: Welfare Agency.- 11.1 A Queuing Model.- 11.2 Analysis.- 11.3 Discussion.- 11.4 Generalization.- 12. Information Costs: Research Teams.- 12.1 Model.- 12.2 Production Function.- 12.3 Checking.- 13. Loss of Information in Simple Organizations.- 13.1 Setting Targets.- 13.2 Budgeting with Full Information.- 13.3 Incomplete Information.- 14. Loss of Information and Control in Multi-Level Organizations.- 14.1 Loss of Information.- 14.2 Loss of Control.- 15. Uses of Production Functions: Simple Organizations.- 15.1 Attainable Output.- 15.2 Labor Requirements.- 15.3 Supervisory Input.- 15.4 Minimizing the Cost of Given Output.- 15.5 Increasing Returns to Scale.- 16. Uses of Production Functions: Multi-Level Organizations.- 16.1 A Production Function for Management.- 16.2 Allocation of Inputs.- 16.3 Short Run.- 16.4 Medium Run: Optimal Spans of Control.- 16.5 Medium Run: Cost Functions.- 16.6 Long Run: Optimal Number of Ranks.- 16.7 Long Run: Cost Functions.- IV. Advantage and Motivation.- 17. Organizations vs. Individuals.- 17.1 Organization of Individual Effort.- 17.2 Larger Output: Simple Organization.- 17.3 Advantage of Simple Organization.- 17.4 Utilizing Better Qualified Personnel.- 18. Management Motivation: Principal and Agent.- 18.1 Introduction.- 18.2 Managers as Principals.- 18.3 Linear Homogeneous Production Function.- 18.4 Managers as Agents.- 18.5 Increasing Returns to Scale.- 19. The Economics of Hierarchy.- 19.1 Management by Delegation.- 19.2 Optimization.- 19.3 Discussion: Emerging Wage Structure.- 19.4 Loss of Control.- 19.5 Team Work at the Top.- 19.6 Long Run.- 19.7 Organizational Modes of an Industry.- 20. Alternatives to Hierarchy: Partnerships.- 20.1 Partnership Defined.- 20.2 Equal Sharing and Full Time Work.- 20.3 Advantage of Partnership: Fixed Shares.- 20.4 Proportional Rewards.- Conclusion.- Appendix A. Deriving Supervisory Relationships from Control.- Appendix B. Average Span of Control and More Graph Theory.- Appendix C. Proof of Lemma for Section 6.9.- Selected Bibliography.- Name Index.