The Syrian Intervention in Lebanon 1975-76

ISBN-13: 9781503205499 / Angielski / Miękka / 2014 / 54 str.

Usmc Command and Staff College

Opis

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Syrian intervention in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1976 extended the conflict and caused then President Hafiz al-Assad to fail in achieving his long-term strategic objectives. In 1975, Civil War in Lebanon broke out. The following year, 35,000 Syrian troops entered the country and remain there today. Syrian President Hafiz al- Assad had five strategic goals in Lebanon: (1) Prevention of a radical regime from gaining power; (2) Securing the Syrian western flank from Israeli invasion; (3) Controlling the Palestinian Liberation Organization; (4) Gaining legitimacy as leader of pan-Arabism following the death of Egypt's Gamal Nasser, and; (5) Enhancing the prospect of gaining Lebanon as part of a "Greater Syria." While initially successful, Assad failed to achieve his long-term goals largely due to a failure of strategy in Lebanon. During the conflict, the Syrians fought against the PLO. This action against the leaders of the Palestinian resistance movement were widely unpopular and protested within the Arab states, including Syria. Assad was never able to gain control of the PLO, and the outrage among the Arab nations denied him the chance to ever gain legitimacy as the leader of pan-Arabism. Moreover, the long occupation by Syrian troops led to Israeli intervention and continued violence in Lebanon, preventing Assad from achieving two other strategic goals. At the strategic level, Syria's intervention failed. Other factors contributed to the failure and are instructive to United States warfighters and warplanners. When placed against the Powell Doctrine, it is evident that Syrian military actions were at odds with the precepts of the use of military force expressed by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. Assad failed to exploit all diplomatic means available to him. He failed to adequately weigh risks against gains. He discounted the political costs of military intervention. And he failed to apply decisive force once he decided to use military force to achieve his goals.