1.1. An Argumentation Approach to the Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate
1.2. Just the Arguments
1.3. Chapter Summary
1.4. Chapter Glossary
1.5. References and Further Readings
2. Realism versus Antirealism in Contemporary Philosophy of Science
2.1. The Three Dimensions of Scientific Realism
2.2. “Just Say No” (to Case Studies)
2.3. Chapter Summary
2.4. Chapter Glossary
2.5. References and Further Readings
3. Key Positions in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate
3.1. Explanationist Realism
3.2. Instrumentalism
3.3. Constructive Empiricism
3.4. Entity Realism
3.5. Structural Realism
3.6. Chapter Summary
3.7. Chapter Glossary
3.8. References and Further Readings
4. Key Arguments for Scientific Realism
4.1. The Positive Argument for Scientific Realism
4.2. The Slippery Slope Argument for Instrumental Observation
4.3. The Argument from Observability In Principle
4.4. The Argument from Corroboration
4.5. The Argument from the Exponential Growth of Science
4.6. Chapter Summary
4.7. Chapter Glossary
4.8. References and Further Readings
5. Key Arguments against Scientific Realism
5.1. The “Graveyard” Argument
5.2. The Positive Argument for Constructive Empiricism
5.3. The Underconsideration Argument
5.4. The Argument from Unconceived Alternatives
5.5. The Argument from Changing Research Interests
5.6. Chapter Summary
5.7. Chapter Glossary
5.8. References and Further Readings
6. Relative Realism: The Best of Both Worlds
6.1. Approximate Truth versus Comparative Truth
6.2. The Kuhnian Argument from the Illusive Truth of Whole Theories
6.3. The Argument from the Comparative Evaluation of Theories
6.4. The Argument from the Relative Success of Theories
6.5. Comparing Comparative Realism and Relative Realism
6.6. Relative Realism as a Middle Ground Position
6.7. Chapter Summary
6.8. Chapter Glossary
6.9. References and Further Readings
Glossary
Index
Moti Mizrahi is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Florida Institute of Technology. He is the editor of The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation? (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018). He is an Associate and Book Reviews Editor of Philosophia (Springer). He has published extensively on the philosophy of science, the scientific realism/antirealism debate, the epistemology of philosophy, and argumentation. His work has appeared in journals such as Argumentation, Erkenntnis, Philosophical Studies, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, and Synthese.
This book offers a close and rigorous examination of the arguments for and against scientific realism and introduces key positions in the scientific realism/antirealism debate, which is one of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of science. On the one hand, scientific realists argue that we have good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories are approximately true because, if they were not even approximately true, they would not be able to explain and predict natural phenomena with such impressive accuracy. On the other hand, antirealists argue that the success of science does not warrant belief in the approximate truth of our best scientific theories. This is because the history of science is a graveyard of theories that were once successful but were later discarded. The author eventually settles on a middle-ground position between scientific realism and antirealism called “relative realism”.