The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution

ISBN-13: 9780631188032 / Angielski / Miękka / 1993 / 228 str.

Colin McGinn

Opis

Can consciousness be fitted into a naturalistic worldview or is it inherently mysterious? In virtue of what does a physical organism come to have an inner conscious life? This book argues that we are not equipped to understand the workings of conciousness, despite its objective naturalness. Introspection does not reveal the hiddent structure of consciousness and it is this that joins experience to the material world.

Recenzje

"These essays provide a vivid introduction to current views in the philosophy of mind and to their immediate precursors ... an up–to–date, sophisticated and enjoyably tendentious account ... if you want to read somebody clever worrying about a problem that′s worth somebody clever′s worrying about, read The Problem of Consciousness." Jerry Fodor, London Review of Books

Spis treści

Preface.

1. Can We Solve the Mind–Body Problem?.

2. Consciousness and Content.

3. Consciousness and the Natural Order.

4. The Hidden Structure of Consciousness.

5. Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.

6. Philosophical Materialism.

7. Functionalism and Phenomenalism: A Critical Note.

8. Could a Machine be Conscious?.

Index.

O autorze

Colin McGinn was formerly Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy, Oxford University. He is the author of The Character of Mind (1981), The Subjective View (1982), Wittgenstein on Meaning (Blackwell, 1984) and Mental Content (Blackwell, 1989).

Blurb

The existence of consciousness in a material world has long seemed mysterious. This book attempts to account for the mystery in a new way. It is not a matter of the world containing an objective miracle or a metaphysical enigma. Consciousness does not undermine atheistic naturalism. Nor is it that we are in the grip of a philosophical mistake – that there is nothing in reality to worry about. Consciousness does exist, and it cannot be explained by the physical sciences. The mystery arises, rather, from our modes of concept–formation: we cannot in principle arrive at a theory that would render the nature of consciousness explicable to us, despite its inherent naturalness.

The Problem of Consciousness develops this point of view by considering subjectivity, intentionality, the limits of introspection, mental causation, and the hidden structure of consciousness. It also includes chapters on philosophical laws, mental kinds, functionalism and machine consciousness.

Overall, the book aims to confront the problem of consciousness in all its difficulty while refusing to be overawed by it.