The Paradox of Punishment: Reflections on the Economics of Criminal Justice

ISBN-13: 9783030316976 / Angielski / Miękka / 2020 / 234 str.

Thomas J. Miceli

Spis treści

1. Prologue: The Paradox of Punishment

Part I: Competing Economic Theories of Crime

2. The Social Cost of Crime: Deterrence

3. Crime as Exchange: Retribution

Part II: The Institutional Structure of Punishment

4. Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Discretion: Balancing Deterrence and Retribution

5. Plea Bargaining: Negotiated Justice

Part III: Other Objectives of Punishment

6. Repeat Offenders: Marginal Deterrence and Redemption

7. Individual versus Collective Responsibility: It Takes a Village

8. The Limits of Punishment: Of Angels and Bad Men

Part IV: Conclusion

9: Epilogue: What Have We Learned?

O autorze

Thomas J. Miceli is Professor of Economics at the University of Connecticut, USA. His research is largely in the area of law and economics, with particular emphasis on property and criminal law. He is a recognized authority on the economics of eminent domain, a subject on which he has authored or co-authored three books. He has also published undergraduate and graduate level textbooks on law and economics, and has co-authored a law school textbook. Currently, he serves as an associate editor for the International Review of Law and Economics.

Blurb

This book explores the insights that can be gained by looking at the criminal justice system from an economic point of view. It provides an economic analysis of the institutional structure and function of the criminal justice system, how its policies are formulated, and how they affect behavior. Yet it goes beyond an examination of specific policies to address the broad question of how law influences behavior. For example, it examines how concepts such as the possibility of redemption affect the decisions of repeat offenders, and whether individual responsibility is (or should be) a pre-requisite for punishment. Finally, the book argues that, in addition to the threat of criminal sanctions, law inculcates principles of acceptable behavior among citizens by asserting that certain acts are “against the law.” This “expressive function” of law can influence behavior to the extent that at least some people in society are receptive to such a message. For these people, the moral content of law has more than mere symbolic value, and consequently, it can expand the scope of traditional law enforcement while lowering its cost. Another goal of the book is therefore to use economic theory to assess this dualistic function of law by specifically recognizing how its policies can both internalize an ethic of obedience to the law among some people irrespective of its consequences, while simultaneously threatening to punish those who only respond to external incentives.