The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism: Neuroethics and Seeming States

ISBN-13: 9781350297579 / Angielski / Twarda / 2022 / 264 str.

Northeastern Hossein Dabbagh (New College of the Humanities

Opis

Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism. His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience.

Spis treści

Acknowledgements Introduction Part I: Mind 1. Philosophical Intuition’s Mental Ontology 2. Moral Intuition’s Mental Ontology: Shifting from Philosophical to Moral Intuition 3. The Use of Intuition as Evidence Part II: Epistemology 4. Shaping Classic Moral Intuitionism: An Examination of H. A. Prichard’s and W. D. Ross’s Ideas 5. Towards the New Moderate Intuitionism: Recent Revivals of Contemporary Moral Intuitionism Part III: Neuroethics 6. Scepticism about Moral Intuition: How My Favoured Account of Intuition Rebuts the Neuroethicists’ Position 7. Scepticism about Moral Intuitionism: How My Favoured Account of Epistemological Intuitionism Rebuts Sinnott-Armstrong’s Position Afterword Notes Bibliography Index