The Metaphysics of Identity Over Time

ISBN-13: 9780333593516 / Angielski / Twarda / 1993 / 228 str.

David S. Oderberg

Opis

This book is a systematic investigation into the metaphysical foundations of identity over time. The author elaborates and evaluates the most common theory about the persistence of objects through time and change, namely the classical theory of spatio-temporal continuity. He shows how the theory requires an ontology of temporal parts, according to which objects are made up of temporally extended segments or stages. This ontology is criticized as unwarranted by modern space-time physics, and as internally incoherent. The author argues that identity over time should be seen as a primitive or unanalysable phenomenon, and that the so-called puzzle cases and paradoxes of identity can be dealt with without recourse to such an ontology.

Spis treści

Acknowledgements PART 1: CONTINUITY AS THE CRITERION OF IDENTITY OVER TIME: THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF CONTINUITY Introduction: Criteria of Identity Defining Spatio-temporal Continuity Further Conditions on Continuity: Necessity and Sufficiency A Note on Concept-responsiveness and Imaginary Cases PART 2: CONTINUITY AS THE CRITERION OF IDENTITY OVER TIME:CONTINUITY WITHOUT STAGES? A Basic Question About Continuity A Via Media? The Problem of Unity in Plurality: The Inadequacy of a Fregean or Quasi-Fregean Solution Neutral Counting The Epistemological Problem The Ontological Problem Consequences of the Above Problems A Note on Personal Identity PART 3: THE ONTOLOGY STAGES (BEING THE ORTHODOX/HUMEAN THEORY OF IDENTITY) Preamble: Object-stages as Material Parts of Persistents An Outline of the Theory of Object-stage (or Temporal Parts of Persistents) Questions Concerning Individuation and Number Problems of Predication and Translation Summary of Discussion So Far Some Objections Considered Geometrical parts and the Circularity Objection PART 4: THE MYTH OF CONTINUITY: WHAT'S WRONG WITH FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM? Analogies Between Space and Time The Idea of Four-dimensionalism Space-time and World-lines World-lines and Identity Four-dimensionalism and Temporal Parts An Ultimate View of Reality? PART 5: THE MYTH OF CONTINUITY: A COHERENT ONTOLOGY? Preamble A Preliminary Diagnosis The Problem of Translation The Conceptual Inseparability of Temporal Parts and Life-histories Further Objections From the Stage Theorist and Their Replies The Confusion of Essence and Accident Some Results of the Inquiry PART 6: SOME PROBLEMS OF IDENTITY OVER TIME CONSIDERED Preamble The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics An Intrinsic Fact? Vague Identity? PART 7: FISSION, INTERMITTENCE AND THE PRIMITIVENESS OF IDENTITY Continuity and the Counter-examples The Primitiveness of Personal Identity Fission Intermittent Existence Conclusion Notes and References Bibliography Index

O autorze

DAVID S. ODERBERG is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Reading. He was previously a Lecturer at Trinity and University Colleges, Dublin, and completed his doctorate at Wolfson College, Oxford. He has published articles in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language.