ISBN-13: 9789027711878 / Angielski / Miękka / 1981 / 560 str.
ISBN-13: 9789027711878 / Angielski / Miękka / 1981 / 560 str.
When the original Dutch version of this book was presented in 1971 to the University of Leiden as a thesis for the Doctorate in philosophy, I was prevented by the academic mores of that university from expressing my sincere thanks to three members of the Philosophical Faculty for their support of and interest in my pursuits. I take the liberty of doing so now, two and a half years later. First and foremost I want to thank Professor G. Nuchelmans warmly for his expert guidance of my research. A number of my most im portant sources were brought to my attention by him. During the whole process of composing this book his criticism and encouragement were carried out in a truly academic spirit. He thereby provided working conditions that are a sine qua non for every author who is attempting to approach controversial matters in a scientific manner, conditions which, however, were not easily available at that time. In a later phase I also came into contact with Professors L. M. de Rijk and J. B. Ubbink, with both of whom I had highly stimulating discussions and exchanges of ideas. The present edition contains some entirely new sections, viz. 1-9, IV-29, V-9, V-20, VII-14 (iii), (iv), VII-17 (i), VIII-22, IX-17, IX-19, X-9 and XI-8. Section X-9 was inspired by a remark made by Professor A."
`...one of the most interesting contributions to the history of logic available today, boasting a rare combination of solid scholarship and sharp logical understanding.'
Journal of the History of Philosophy
`...a highly original work of major importance not only in formal logic but also in general philosophy ... Dr. Barth's work is based on an impressively sensitive command of a vast array of ancient, medieval, Renaissance, and more recent formal logic, down to the present day, and has a range of implications far beyond what can be explained in a brief review. ... the mastery so brilliantly in evidence in Dr. Barth's work is still rare elsewhere - a fact shich makes her work all the more welcome.'
The Modern Schoolman
`...profound and of an enormous intellectual richness... extremely rich as to analysis, critical linguistics, that clarifies the logical foundations of philosophy. The author demonstrates great knowledge of logic, of philosophy, and of the history of both, ...this is a work of capital importance due to its content as well as to the method it follows, thus drawing large horizons for future research.'
Estudios Filosoficos (Spain)
1. The Problem.- I. Introduction: Problems and Sources.- 1. The Divided World of Philosophy.- 2. The Methodenstreit in the Humanities and the Social Sciences.- 3. Recent Publications in Traditional Logic: German Idealism and “Dialectics”.- 4. Recent Publications: neo-Thomistic Logic. What-Logic and Relating-Logic.- 5. “Pure Logic” as the Theory of Identity.- 6. The Status of Aristotelian Syllogistic from the Point of View of Contemporary Logic.- 7. The Locke-Berkeley Problem and Fregean Logic.- 8. The Dialogical Formulation of Fregean Elementary Logic.- 9. The Critical Study of Applied Conceptual Structures: a Logical Discipline.- Notes.- II. Naming What is.- 1. A First Acquaintance with Concrete Universal Terms.- 2. The Logophore.- 3. Husserl on Definite Articles.- 4. Definition of “Logophoric Uses” of the Articles and of Other Operators by which Substantives are Formed.- 5. The H-Thesis.- 6. Examples.- Notes.- III. The Semantics of the Logical Constants.- 1. Introduction and Elimination of Logical Constants.- 2. The Meanings of “an Arbitrary S”.- 3. The Problem of the Eliminability of Logophoric Articles and of their Meaning in Discussions.- 4. Von Freytag’s Treatment of das M ist P.- 5. Are Logophoric Judgments in some Cases Real Definitions?.- 6. Are Logophoric Judgments in some Cases a Kind of Modal Judgments?.- 7. Some Introductory Remarks on the Definite Article in Contemporary Logic.- 8. Is the “Pure Logic” a Completed Science?.- Notes.- 2. Historical Survey.- IV. From the History of the Logic of Indefinite Propositions.- 1. Introductory Remarks.- 2. Aristotle’s ???ó???o?.- 3. Propositiones indefinitae in the Logic of the Schoolmen.- 4. Suppositio simplex and suppositio personalis: William of Sherwood.- 5. Suppositio simplex and suppositio personalis: Peter of Spain.- 6. The Theory of suppositio as a Theory of Types.- 7. Mobility and the Logic of General Terms.- 8. The Logic of the Grammatical Singular.- 9. Indicating suppositio by means of Articles.- 10. Indefinita - determinata - indeterminata and the Contemporary uncertainty with Respect to Definite and Indefinite Articles.- 11. Suppositio determinata and Statements of Existence.- 12. Logophoric Value Judgments and suppositio simplex.- 13. Articles Analysed in Terms of Quantifiers: from suppositio simplex to suppositio personalis by means of Polyadic Predication.- 14. “Philosophical” suppositio: suppositio naturalis.- 15. Arguments with Indefinite Premisses in the Logic of the Renaissance: Ramus and Keckermann.- 16. New Foundations: Hospinianus.- 17. Leibniz.- 18. From Wolff to Überweg: ?ó????o? and the Theory of Negation.- 19. Wundt on Logic as the Study of Indefinite Magnitudes.- 20. Are Logophoric Judgments ???ó????o??.- 21. “Absolute” and “Relative” Judgments with “Logical” suppositio in Pfänder’s Logic.- 22. Hering and the Problem of the General Lion.- 23. Propositions indéfinies in the Logique de Port-Royal. Connection with ‘definitio rei’ in Case of a universalité métaphysique.- 24. Exceptions Possible in Case of a universalité morale.- 25. Archbishop Whately’s Perplexity.- 26. Mill as the Heir of Whately: Rejection of Real Definitions.- 27. “The Most Perfect Exposition of Classical Logic”: Keynes.- 28. A Twentieth Century “Philosophical” Logic on Indefinite Propositions and suppositio naturalis: Maritain.- 29. Suppositio naturalis throughout the Centuries.- 30. Reduplicative Propositions: “in so far as” and “as such”.- (i) Reduplicative Propositions.- (ii) Specificatory Propositions.- (iii) Analysis of Specificatory Propositions as Reduplicative Propositions.- Notes.- V. From the History of the Logic of Individual Propositions.- 1. Introductory Remarks about the Use of the Words “Singular” and “Individual”.- 2. Aristotle on Individual Propositions and the Doctrine of ekthesis.- 3. Comparison with Indefinite Propositions in the Organon.- 4. Expository Syllogisms.- 5. Exposition and exemplum in the Logic of the Renaissance.- (i) Influence from Rhetoric.- (ii) Exemplum and similitudo.- (iii) When is an Argument from an exemplum Logically Valid?.- (iv) The Third Figure.- (v) Why were Third Figure Expository Syllogisms Rejected?.- 6. Melanchton’s Example.- 7. The Ramistic Modes.- 8. Hospinianus.- 9. The vis universalis of Singular Propositions.- 10. Leibniz.- 11. Wolff: Definite Descriptions and the dictum de omni.- 12. Kant.- 13. Lambert and the dictum de exemplo. Comparison with Melanchton.- 14. Hegel.- 15. Herbart.- 16. Comparison between the Traditional Theory of Definite Descriptions and Russell’s Theory: Analogy Instead of Identity.- 17. Singular Propositions in the Logic of Maritain.- 18. The Logical Form of Individual Propositions with Definite Descriptions as Grammatical Subject: Russell.- 19. Replacing Proper Names by Descriptions.- 20. Identification by Description.- Notes.- VI. Singular - General - Indefinite.- 1. Logophoric Judgments as Singular Judgments.- 2. Primitive Paradigmatic Logic.- 3. Primitive Paradigmatic Logic Rejected by Pfänder.- 4. Two Kinds of Definite Article with a Generalizing Function. Comparison with Maritain.- 5. Pfänder on the Limitations of Traditional Syllogistic.- 6. A Theory of Entailment?.- 7. The Problem of Relative Generic Judgments and the Variable Copula.- 8. Comparison with Lotze, Sigwart and Jerusalem.- 9. The Relativity of Relative Generic Judgments.- 10. Exemplum and the Method of Variation.- 11. Relation, Analogy, Paradigm: “a Glimpse of Chaos”.- 12. Conclusions.- 13. Glimpses of Grammar.- (i) Jespersen on the Arbitrary Generic Person.- (ii) Negative Indefinite Sentences.- (iii) Singularis - pluralis - indifferentialis.- Notes.- VII. The Identity Theories of the Copula.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Extensional Identity Theories of the Copula.- 3. The Inherence Theory of the Copula.- 4. Comprehensional Identity Theories of the Copula: Logic as the Study of Indefinite Propositions.- 5. Schematic Survey.- 6. Expected Properties of the Notions of Identity and Partial Identity in Traditional Logic.- 7. Fichte’s Logic: a Symmetric Copula.- 8. Reflexivity of the Copula.- 9. Transitivity of the Copula.- 10. Two Kinds of Logical Identity.- 11. Identity-Logic and Contradiction-Logic.- (i) Two Senses of “Logic of Identity”.- (ii) Plato’s Paradox.- 12. Neo-Platonic Fichtean Logic (NPF-logic). The Intensive Identity Theory of the Copula (id-logic).- 13. Later German Traditional Logic and its Relation to the NPF-Logic.- 14. The Traditional Restriction to Symmetric Non-Logical Relations.- (i) Fichte.- (ii) Maritain.- (iii) Modalities and Relations: “Intensional” Logic.- (iv) Aristotle’s Principle of the Absolute.- 15. The Theory of the Copula and Reduplication in Individual Propositions.- 16. A Necessary Condition for id-Logic: Weak Identity-Concepts and Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.- (i) Preliminary Remarks.- (ii) Leibniz’s Weak Notion of Identity: Complete Equality (CE).- (iii) PIi: the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.- 17. From Opaque Similarity (Analogy) to Strong Identity.- (i) Analogy of two Terms Defined as Opaque Similarity.- (ii) A Principle of the Non-Distinction of the Distinct (PND).- 18. From Opaque Similarity to Weak Identity.- 19. Similarity, Equality, and Identity in Later German Traditional logic.- 20. “Is” and “The”: the Need for an id-logical Continuum of Articles or Copulas in order to Distinguish Degrees of Essential Identity.- 21. Id-Logic as Topological Logic.- 22. Concept-Pyramids and Internal Relations: Topological Logic of Internal Genera and Species.- 23. The Thesis of id-Existence.- 24. Partial Identities: Wundt.- 25. Husserl on Identity and Relational Predicates.- 26. Partial Identities in Pfänder’s Logic.- 27. Revolt Against the Intensive Identity-Theory: Lotze on the Copula and the General Dog.- 28. Rejection of Partial Identities: Sigwart.- 29. Conclusion.- 30. Appendix: Veatch on Identity and Senility.- Notes.- 3. Descent.- VIII. Argument by Analogy.- 1. Introductory Remarks.- 2. The Argument by Analogy.- 3. The Logophoric Indefinite Major Premiss.- 4. Analysis of Simple Arguments by Analogy.- 5. Reduction to Two Premisses.- 6. Hegel’s Stress on the Importance of Form.- 7. The Limitation to Three Terms.- 8. The Tautological Premiss.- 9. Analogical Terms and Analogical Language.- 10. Application of the Ockham-Wallis-Kant-Wolff Reduction to the Argument by Analogy.- 11. Burburu.- 12. The Imperfectness of the Argument by Analogy and the Problem of Dependability.- 13. A Comparison between Hegel’s and Mill’s Analyses of the Example of the Inhabited Earth.- 14. A Contemporary Interpreter of Hegel on the Argument by Analogy.- 15. Interpretation of Hegel’s Argument by Analogy.- 16. Why the Fourth Term cannot be Expressed.- 17. Arguments by Necessity.- 18. Either-or and definitio rei.- 19. Descent to the Moon.- 20. Contempt for the Counter-Example.- (i) The Situation in Hegel’s Logic.- (ii) The Logical Problem and its Solution.- 21. Deontic Logic and the Logic of Potentiality.- 22. The Theory of Formal Signs.- 23. Comparison between Hegel, Pfänder, Maritain, and Veatch.- Notes.- IX. The Problem of the Logic of Relations and its Connection with the Logic of the Articles.- 1. Introductory Remarks.- 2. Wundt on Relations and Language.- 3. The Auxiliary Rule of Concept Comparison: Unlimited Reification and Proliferation of Articles.- (i) Wundt.- (ii) Husserl.- 4. Arguments by Analogy.- 5. From “Resembles” to “Is”: a Transition into Mysticism.- 6. Neglect of the Articles in Descriptions and the Exact Argument by Analogy.- 7. The Descending Argument by Analogy versus the dictum de exemplo.- 8. Ideal Instantiation.- 9. The Tyranny of the First Figure and Reduction of Articles to Quantification by means of Polyadic Predication.- 10. Substitution in Individual Propositions: the Analogical Doctrine of Substitution and the Fallacy of Undistributed Middle.- (i) The Analogical Doctrine of Substitution.- (ii) The vis universalis of Individual Propositions and the Fallacy of Undistributed Middle.- 11. Dissociation of Arguments by Analogy from Syllogistic.- 12. Two Meanings of “Deduction” and “Induction” and the Postulate of Deductivity.- (i) What is meant by “Deduction” and “Induction”?.- (ii) The Postulate of Deductivity.- 13. Arguments by Analogy in the Logics of Lotze and Sigwart.- (i) Lotze.- (ii) Sigwart.- 14. The Fear of the Counter-Example: I. Analogical and Relative Judgments.- (i) Pfänder.- (ii) Bosanquet.- 15. The Fear of the Counter-Example: II. Analogical Terms.- 16. Pure Philosophical Logic: Analogy, Symmetry, and Logical Stability.- 17. A Problem of Modern Logic: the Logical Form of Scientific Laws.- 18. Analogy, Morphology, and Judgments and Arguments ?? ?????????: Descent or Ascent?.- 19. Kant’s Transcendental Deductions.- Notes.- 4. Ascent.- X. Introduction of Indefinite Propositions by Ekthesis.- 1. Particular - Indefinite - Problematic: Indefinite Terms some S.- (i) The Older Tradition.- (ii) The Renaissance.- (iii) The Interregnum.- (iv) Contemporary German idealism.- (v) Neo-Thomism.- 2. Albrecht on Ekthesis of the Middle Concept as a means of Recognizing non-Tautologous Logical Truths.- 3. Aristotle on ???????.- 4. Ekthesis as Existential Instantiation.- 5. Ekthesis as the Introduction of the Conjunction of the Extreme Terms.- (i) Exposition of non-Empty Classes.- (ii) Von Freytag’s Principle of Forgettability (“Vergessbarkeitsprinzip”).- (iii) How Plato’s Principle is Employed.- 6. Defining the Req-ness of s as a no-Risk Ekthetic epagoge: Analogical Knowledge and Ontological Ascent.- (i) Albrecht on the Genesis of Concepts.- (ii) From Analogy to Identity.- 7. Particular Propositions as Expressions of Judgments of Equality.- 8. Conclusion.- 9. Traditional Logical Syntax.- (i) Introductory Remarks.- (ii) Aristotelian Syntax.- (iii) Kantian Syntax: Negation of the Subject and of the Predicate.- (iv). Hamiltonian Syntax: “Quantification of the Predicate”.- (v) SiP-SoP-Syntax.- 10. Rejection of Indefinite Terms some S: Brentano and Frege.- 11. Reaction: Husserl on Existential Propositions.- 12. Interpreting “All” and “Some”: Universe of Discourse or Metaphysical Being?.- 13. Linsky’s Operators: a Dialogieal Desideratum.- Notes.- XI. Conjunction, Potentiality, and Disjunction.- 1. The Problem of the Logic of Disjunctions and the Loss of De Morgan’s Laws.- 2. Conjunctive and aut-Junctive Analysis of General Concepts.- 3. Non-Truth-Functional Connectives: suppositio disjuncta and suppositio copulata.- (i) Suppositio disjunctiva and suppositio disjuncta.- (ii) Suppositio copulativa and suppositio copulata.- 4. Angelelli’s Findings in the Light of the Traditional Interpretation of Ekthesis.- 5. Sides and Aspects: Introduction of Spatial Operators.- 6. Sides, Aspects, and aut-Junctions.- 7. “Can” and “Must” in von Freytag’s Logic.- 8. A Simple Fallacy?.- (i) Quantifiers or Modalities?.- (ii) This Fallacy is a Feature of the Old NP+VP-Logic (Subject-Predicate Logic).- (iii) Purtill on Logical Possibility.- (iv) Lakoff’s Example.- 9. Logical Space and Logical Potential in pre-Kantian Logic: the Logical Field of Force.- 10. Two Introduction-Rules for Potentiality-Operators.- 11. The Logic of Potentialities in Practice.- 12. From Logical Potentiality to Inclusive Disjunction.- 13. A Standpoint Revised: Case Study.- Notes.- XII. Summary and Conclusion.- 1. Four Points of Departure and Five Themes.- 2. Individual and Particular Premisses and Universal Conclu-sions in the Traditional Logic of the Quantifiers.- (i) The Traditional Logic of “All” and “Some”.- (ii) Ekthesis.- (iii) The Potential Genus.- (iv) Ekthesis and Abstraction.- (v) Inclusive Disjunction.- (vi) The Traditional Conception of Ekthesis as Paradigmatic Thinking.- (vii) The “Tyranny of the First Figure” and the Postulate of Deductivity.- (viii) Value Judgments.- 3. Monadic Predication, Internal Relations and the Hierarchy of Articles.- 4. From Analogy to Essential Identity.- 5. From suppositio to Substitution.- (i) Decline of the Theory of suppositio in Traditional Philosophy.- (ii) From a Small Number of suppositiones to the One “Philosophical” suppositio naturalis.- (iii) The “Philosophical” suppositio and Ekthesis.- (iv) The Dialectical Continuum and the Doctrine of Analogical Substitution.- 6. Dialogical Criticism or Logical Stability?.- (i) The Traditional Preference for Symmetrical Notions and Syncategoremata.- (ii) Kant’s Theory of Negation.- (iii) “The Humanist Assault on the Oral Disputation”.- (iv) Restoration of External Secondness in Logic.- Index of Proper Names.- Index of Subjects.
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