The Interest Approach to Choice of Law: With Special Reference to Tort Problems

ISBN-13: 9789401700191 / Angielski / Miękka / 1970 / 273 str.

Amos Shapira

Opis

This book is based on a doctoral thesis submitted to Yale University Law School in 1968. I wish to acknowledge my deepest gratitude to my super visor in the writing of the thesis, Professor Ronald M. Dworkin, whose in sights and criticism have conspicuously contributed to the present work. Time and again I have been inspired by the ideas expressed by hirn both in personal discussions and in his Conflict of Laws and Jurisprudence courses. It has been my privilege also to have had Professors Leon S. Lipson and Guido Calabresi as supervisors. I have derived great benefit from their sug gestions. A sincerely feIt appreciation is expressed to all three persons. A special debt of gratitude is owing to the Yale Law School for the gener ous financial support extended to me. I also wish to record my indebtedness to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and to Tel-Aviv University for their financial assistance. I am extremely grateful to Mr. Michael Reiss, '68 Yale Law School for his significant editorial assistance. Thanks are also due to my wife Ettie for invaluable help and encouragement. Finally, I wish to thank the publishers for their courtesy and cooperation. A.S."

Spis treści

I. The Traditional Approach to Choice of Law.- A. The General Theory.- 1. Jurisprudential underpinnings: Territorial Sovereignty, Legislative Jurisdiction and Vested Rights.- 2 Internationalism and Universalism.- 3. System-pointing rules — the systematics of broad categories and “connecting factors”.- 4. Asserted policy bases — uniformity of result and ease of application.- B. The Gap between Judicial Doing and Reasoning — “Escape Devices”.- C. Critical Evaluation of the Traditional Approach.- D. The Traditional Tort Choice-of-Law Rules.- 1. In the United States.- 2. In England.- 3. In the Continent of Europe and other Countries.- II. Three Preliminary Clarifications: Transnational Versus Interstate Conflicts, the Lex Fori Threshold and Foreign Law as Factual Datum.- A. Transnational Versus Interstate Conflicts.- 1. The transnational-interstate dichotomy.- a. The impact of constitutional mandates.- b. The factor of mutuality, reciprocity and sense of unity.- c. The scope of substantive diversity among different laws.- d. The practical possibility of forum shopping.- e. The feasibility of substantive law unification.- f. The frequency and subject-matter of conflict-of-laws litigation.- 2. Seperate methodological treatment of interstate and transnational conflicts?.- B. The Lex Fori Threshold.- 1. Introductory note.- 2. The Case against a lex fori threshold — “forum shopping”.- a. Facts and fancies of the forum shopping phenomenon.- b. The correctives of jurisdictional reform and forum non conveniens.- 3. The case for a lex fori threshold.- a. Simplicity, economy and efficiency.- b. Justice and reason under law.- c. Jurisprudential premise — presumption as to the prima facie functional reach of domestic legal rules.- 4. Some specific features of a lex fori threshold in cases involving foreign elements.- a. “Sophisticated” lex fori.- b. Lex fori as sole candidate or last resort.- C. Foreign Law as Factual Datum.- III. The Concept of Public and Private Interests in the Choice-of-Law — Process — Perspectives and Values.- A. The Concept of Public Interests.- 1. Fundamental Jurisprudential underpinnings.- 2. The “interest” trend in choice of law — a brief historical sketch.- 3. Public interests — a comprehensive view.- B. The Concept of Private Interests.- 1. The “justice in the particular case” dilemma.- 2. The principle of rational connection between parties and laws.- a. The “submission and consent” fallacy.- b. The “foreseeability” and “vindication of justified expectations” desideratum.- c. The “equitable responsibility to ascertain foreign law” consideration.- d. The “reasonable reliance” criterion.- e. The “fair notice” rationale.- 3. The assessment of private interests as a coherent part of the process of interest analysis.- C. An Interest-based Approach — The Values of Judicial Creativity, Concretization and Rationality, “Domestication” of the Choice Process and Functionalism in lieu of Territorialism.- 1. Judicial creativity.- 2. Rationality in terms of concrete rules and consequences.- 3. “Domestication” of the choice of law process.- 4. Functionalism in lieu of territorialism.- IV. Public Interests Peculiar to Conflicts Contexts: Transnational Concerns.- A. The Concept of Transnational Concerns.- B. Transnational Concerns in Reciprocal Accommodation of Public Interests and Uniform Treatment of Distinctive Problem-Areas.- 1. Reciprocal accommodation of public interests.- a. Moderate delineation of public interests.- b. Harmonization of compatible public interests.- c. Facilitation of commonly desired transnational activity.- d. Mutual assistance in the handling of foreign law.- 2. Uniform treatment of distinctive problem-areas.- a. The traditional desiderata of predictability and uniformity-fancies and facts.- b. Uniformity of results — a discriminatory approach.- V. The Process of Interest Analysis-Ascertainment of Relevant Interests.- A. Ordinary and Peculiar Aspects of the Interpretive Function.- B. Factors and Guidelines in the Ascertainment of Relevant Interests.- 1. Initial identification of potentially concerned jurisdictions.- 2. Enlightenment in the ascertainment of relevant interests.- 3. The putative interest dilemma.- 4. The realistic and timely coincidence of rule-supporting purposes and relevant connecting-factors.- 5. The pitfall of eclectic combination of interests.- C. Practical Complexities in the Ascertainment of Relevant Interests.- 1. The general problem.- 2. Some mitigating considerations.- 3. The procedural aspects of foreign law ascertainment.- VI. The Process of Interest Analysis-Elimination and Resolution of Conflicts of Interests.- A. Elimination of Apparent-but-not-real Conflicts of Interests.- 1. The concept of illusory, false and avoidable conflicts.- 2. The substance-procedure dichotomy revisited.- B. Resolution of True Conflicts of Interests.- 1. The general dilemma.- 2. The invariable recourse to the lex fori solution.- 3. Rational guiding considerations — the respective strength and merits of conflicting interests.- a. Choice in terms of the relative strength of conflicting interests.- b. Choice in terms of the relative merits of conflicting interests.- C. Recourse to the Lex Fori as a Last Resort in Conflicts Adjudication.- VII. The Prospects of Standardization in the Process of Interest Analysis.- A. New Choice-of-Law Standards — Fancies and Facts.- 1. The illusions of Ehrenzweig’s “true” rules.- 2. The ambiguities of the “most significant relationship” formula of the Restatement Second.- 3. The shortcomings of Cavers’ “principles of preference”.- B. Avenues of Standardization: Accumulation of Interest-Analyses Data, Judicial and Legislative Scope-Delimitation of Legal Prescriptions, and International Legislation in Distinctive Problem-Areas.- 1. Accumulation of interest-analyses data.- 2. Judicial and legislative scope-delimitation of legal prescriptions.- 3. International legislation in distinctive problem-areas.- Appendix. An Exercise in Interest Analysis.- Selected Bibliography.- General Index.