'Hernán Flom studies rigorously the relationship between elected politicians and police to explain diverse informal regulatory regimes of drug markets in Argentina and Brazil. This book contributes to theorizing the multiple, and often unexpected, ways in which states interact with drug markets, not only repressing them or enforcing the law, but also tolerating, preying upon, or protecting them. His focus on the police as a pivotal actor expands our knowledge of the intricate dynamics that connect states and criminal markets. The book is an important addition to the literature on criminal violence, drug markets, and policing.' Angélica Durán-Martínez, Associate Professor of Political Science, Director of Global Studies Ph.D. Program, The University of Massachusetts Lowell
1. Informal regulation of criminal markets in Latin America; 2. A theory of drug market regulation; 3. Particularistic confrontation: The persistent war between gangs and police in Rio De Janeiro; 4. Particularistic negotiation: The decentralization of police corruption and increase in violence in Rosario, Santa Fe; 5. Coordinated protection: The consolidation of centralized corruption in Buenos Aires; 6. Coordinated coexistence: The consolidation of a police-gang truce in São Paulo; 7. Regulation of criminal markets in weak institutional contexts.