The Effect of Asymmetric Entry Costs on Bertrand Competition

ISBN-13: 9781523326587 / Angielski / Miękka / 2016 / 26 str.

Federal Trade Commission;Penny Hill Press Inc

Opis

By permitting firms to have different entry costs, I generalize two previously studied models of two-stage entry and pricing amongst Bertrand competitors. I find that the existing results depend critically on the symmetry assumption. For example, if firms' entry decisions are observed before price-setting occurs, then total welfare can increase following the introduction of a potential entrant, in contrast to the unambiguous welfare reduction found in the symmetric setting. If firms' entry decisions are unobserved before pricing-setting occurs, then the expected price typically decreases or remains unchanged following the introduction of a potential entrant, in contrast to the unambiguous price increase found in the symmetric setting. In both price-setting environments, competition increases following the introduction of potential entrants with sufficiently low entry costs, a finding that is obscured by focusing on the symmetric models.

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