The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945-1955

ISBN-13: 9780198275411 / Angielski / Twarda / 1989 / 272 str.

William R. Clark; Nicholas J. Wheeler; Ian Clark

Opis

Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What plans were there for using it? Employing the previously inaccessible confidential records of the British government in the decade after World War II, including those of the Chiefs of Staff, this book provides the first detailed assessment of the technical, political, and economic factors behind British nuclear policy. The authors argue that British thinking on nuclear deterrence was distinctive and made a unique contribution to early theorizing on nuclear weapons, and compare the strategic thought of Britain and the United States.

Recenzje

'This book constitutes a major contribution to our understanding of the shifts in British strategic thinking during a decade when the foundations of Britain's nuclear force were laid.' Richard J. Aldrich, History

Spis treści

Acknowledgements; Introduction; Britain's strategic legacy; Atomic decisions and threat assessment; British origins of nuclear deterrence 1945-6; The doctrine of damage limitation 1946-9; Operational planning and Anglo-American strategic co-ordination 1945-50; Korea and Anglo-American nuclear strategy 1950-2; The global strategy paper and the United States `New Look'; Mass destruction, nuclear war-fighting and delivery systems 1953-5; The hydrogen bomb and deterrence in concert 1954-5; Conclusion