The Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918-1920: The Diplomacy of Chaos

ISBN-13: 9781137435712 / Angielski / Twarda / 2015 / 317 str.

Ian C. D. Moffat

Opis

Chaos has many names: anarchy, pandemonium, turmoil, or, utter confusion; and there is no better example than the events concerning Russia during the Great War and the debacle that was the Allied attempts at intervention there. This chaos was self-inflicted by the Allies themselves. The Allied strategic objectives in Russia changed over the course of three distinct time periods. From the first Russian Revolution in March 1917 to the November Bolshevik revolution, the Allies tried to keep Russia in the war as an active ally. From November 1917 to the November 1918 Armistice, they tried to prevent the Bolsheviks from making a separate peace and, failing that, to re-establish an Eastern Front. Finally from the Armistice to the fall of the Whites in Crimea in 1920, the Allies tried to strangle Bolshevism. Throughout, Britain remained the driving force despite Lloyd George's antipathy towards military action and President Woodrow Wilson's efforts to minimize intervention.

Spis treści

List of Images List of Maps Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations 1. Introduction 2. Year of Crisis – 1917 3. Stalled Intervention – North, South, East and West 4. American-Japanese Rivalry in Siberia 5. The Allies Act – Murmansk and Archangel 6. Too Few, Too Late – The Caucasus, the North and Siberia – Summer 1918 7. Disaster for the Misunderstood – Anti-Bolshevik Support in North Russia – August to November 1918 8. Friends or Enemies Together? Allies in Siberia – Summer 1918 9. Dying in Russia while others Debate – October 1918 – January 1919 10. Vision Versus Reality: The Paris Peace Conference and Russia – January to February 1919 11. Retreat, Abandonment and Bolshevik Victory – February to April 1919 12. Allied Evacuation and White Victories – March to June 1919 13. Allied Retreat and White Defeat – May to October 1919 14. Red Triumph and White Humiliation – July 1919 to November 1920 15. Conclusion Annex Bibliography Index

O autorze

Dr. Moffat is a retired Canadian Naval officer with over forty years in uniform. He was part of the planning staff for the RCN and commanded the NATO Counter IED Training group in Afghanistan. He has a PhD in War Studies and specialises in International Relations, British, Canadian and Russian military history and the Great War. He has published papers on Military Ethics, Naval Strategist Julian Corbett and Canadian civil-military relations in the inter-war years.