Suppositional Reasoning in Scientific Explanations

ISBN-13: 9783836456227 / Angielski / Miękka / 2008 / 104 str.

Avital Pilpel

Opis

To suppose X means to pretend to change ones belief for the sake of the argument to include X. I examine the role of suppositional reasoning in the evaluation of purported scientific explanations of various sorts, based on Hempel and Oppenheims deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical explanations. First, for each type of explanation, I present the suppositional reasoning conditions it must satisfy. Second, I argue that a specific decision making method (Isaac Levis) should be used to determine how one is to change ones beliefs for the sake of the argument in each case. Third, I evaluate in detail whether purported explanations, both intuitively explanatory and intuitively non-explanatory satisfy (or do not satisfy) these conditions. Fourth, I show that the suppositional reasoning conditions for explanations, when evaluated correctly, systematically solve the many problems of the original Hempel-Oppenheim model of explanations.

O autorze

Pilpel, Avital Avital Pilpel earned his Ph.D. in philosophy from Columbia University (New York). His main interests are philosophy of science, logic, and rational decision making. In particular he is interested in rational belief change in scientific inquiry.