Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics Zeta

ISBN-13: 9783030221607 / Angielski / Twarda / 2019 / 354 str.

Norman O. Dahl

Spis treści

Chapter 1: Introduction

 

Chapter 2: Background Considerations

 

Chapter 3: The Categories View of Basic Constituents

 

Chapter 4: Two New Candidates for Basic Constituents

 

Chapter 5: The Metaphysics and Metaphysics Zeta

 

Chapter 6:  Z.1, Substantial Forms or Individual Composites as Basic Constituents

 

Chapter 7: Z.3, The Rejection of Matter

 

Chapter 8: Z.4-5, Essence

 

Chapter 9: Z.6 and the Pale Man Argument

 

Chapter 10: Z.6 and the Argument About Platonic Forms

 

Chapter 11: Z.6 and the Regress Argument

 

Chapter 12:  Z.7-9, The Reintroduction of Matter and Form

 

Chapter 13:  Z.10-11, Does Form Have Matter as Part of It?

 

Chapter 14: The Universal as Substance: Z.13 1038b8-1039a3 – Problems of Interpretation

 

Chapter 15: The Universal as Substance: 1038b8-1039a3 -- Solutions to the Problems

 

Chapter 16: The Universal as Substance: Z.13-16 -- An Aporia and What Follows

 

Chapter 17: Z.17, A Fresh Start

 

Chapter 18: Conclusion

O autorze

Norman O. Dahl is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota.  His main interests are moral philosophy and ancient philosophy.  In the latter area he is the author of Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will (1984), articles on Metaphysics Zeta, and publications on Aristotle’s ethics and Plato’s ethics.

Blurb

This book argues that according to Metaphysics Zeta, substantial forms constitute substantial being in the sensible world, and individual composites make up the basic constituents that possess this kind of being. The study explains why Aristotle provides a reexamination of substance after the Categories, Physics, and De Anima, and highlights the contribution Z is meant to make to the science of being. Norman O. Dahl argues that Z.1-11 leaves both substantial forms and individual composites as candidates for basic constituents, with Z.12 being something that can be set aside. He explains that although the main focus of Z.13-16 is to argue against a Platonic view that takes universals to be basic constituents, some of its arguments commit Aristotle to individual composites as basic constituents, with Z.17’s taking substantial form to constitute substantial being is compatible with that commitment.