Structural Rationality and Other Essays on Practical Reason

ISBN-13: 9783319955063 / Angielski / Twarda / 2019 / 134 str.

Julian Nida-Rumelin

Spis treści

Introduction and Overview.- Chapter1. Acting on Beliefs.- Chapter2. Structures of Agency.- Chapter3. Reasons for Action.- Chapter4. Cooperation.- Chapter5. Communication.- Chapter6. Structural Intentions.- Chapter7. Weakness of Will.- Chapter8. Structural Coherence.

O autorze

Julian Nida-Rümelin is a professor of philosophy and political theory at the Ludwig-Maximlians-University in Munich, Germany. He studied philosophy, physics, mathematics, and political sciences. After his Ph.D in philosophy and his habilitation, he taught philosophy, ethics and political theory at different universities: state university of Minnesota (1991), University of Tübingen (1991-1993), University of Göttingen (1993-2003), Humboldt University Berlin (2001-) and University of Munich (2004-). Nida-Rümelin was elected president of the German Association for Analytical Philosophy (GAP) 1994-1997, and President of the German Society for Philosophy (2009-2011). He is a member of several academies, among others: the academy of sciences and humanities, Berlin and the European Academy of Sciences and Arts. For five years he left academia and changed to cultural politics, serving as a state minister for culture and media in the first national government led by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2002). 

Blurb

In this book, the author shows that it is necessary to enrich the conceptual frame of the theory of rational choice beyond consequentialism. He argues that consequentialism as a general theory of rational action fails and that this does not force us into the dichotomy teleology vs deontology. The unity of practical reason can be saved without consequentialism. In the process, he presents insightful criticism of standard models of action and rational choice. This will help readers discover a new perspective on the theory of rationality.

The approach is radical: It transcends the reductive narrowness of instrumental rationality without denying its practical impact. Actions do exist that are outlined in accordance to utility maximizing or even self-interest maximizing. Yet, not all actions are to be understood in these terms. Actions oriented around social roles, for example, cannot count as irrational only because there is no known underlying maximizing heuristic.

The concept of bounded rationality tries to embed instrumental rationality into a form of life to highlight limits of our cognitive capabilities and selective perceptions. However, the agent is still left within the realm of cost-benefit-reasoning. The idea of social preferences or meta-preferences cannot encompass the plurality of human actions. According to the author they ignore the plurality of reasons that drive agency. Hence, they coerce agency in fitting into a theory that undermines humanity. His theory of structural rationality acknowledges lifeworld patterns of interaction and meaning.