Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs

ISBN-13: 9783030433918 / Angielski / Miękka / 2020 / 91 str.

Luca Moretti

Spis treści

1. Introduction

2. Phenomenal conservatism

2.1 Introduction

2.2 The basics of phenomenal conservatism

2.3 The nature of seemings

2.4 Supporting phenomenal conservatism

2.5 Preliminary criticism of phenomenal conservatism

2.6 Conclusions

References

3. Cognitive penetrability

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Characterizing cognitive penetrability

3.3 The epistemic problem of cognitive penetrability

3.4 The reliabilist account

3.5 The inferentialist account

3.6 Taming cognitive penetrability

3.7 Conclusions

References

4. The Bayesian objection

4.1 Introduction

4.2 White’s objection

4.3 Responding to White’s objection

4.4 Perceptual appearances and reflective justification

4.5 Conclusions

References

5. Antiscepticism and easy justification

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Antiscepticism and reflective awareness

5.3 Easy justification objections

5.4 Answering the easy justification from closure objection

5.5 Answering the easy justification from bootstrapping objection

5.6 Conclusions

References

6. Concluding remarks

O autorze

Luca Moretti is a Reader at the University of Aberdeen’s Department of Philosophy and a Visiting Professor at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. He holds an MLitt in Logic & Metaphysics from St Andrews and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from King's College London. His research areas include epistemology and metaphysics, and he has substantively contributed to the debates on Bayesian coherentism, transmission and failure of transmission of justification, and phenomenal conservatism. Moretti has published articles in various journals, including Analysis, Philosophical Studies, and Philosophy of Science.