Seemings

ISBN-13: 9781032289601 / Twarda / 2023 / 312 str.

Opis

This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions.

Spis treści

Introductory Note Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford, and Matthias Steup  Part 1: Seemings and How They Justify  1. The Chemistry of Epistemic Justification Matthias Steup  2. Seemings and Truth Blake McAllister  3. Nonsubjectivism about How Things Seem Matthew McGrath  4. Against the Phenomenal View of Evidence: Disagreement and Shared Evidence Elizabeth Jackson  5. Appearances and the Problem of Stored Beliefs Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain  6. Emotions as Evidence for Evaluations Earl Conee and Richard Feldman  7. How to Be Irrational Michael Huemer  Part 2: Seemings in Inference and Inquiry  8. Dogmatism, Seemings, and Non-Deductive Inferential Justification Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Electra Gatzia  9. Inference Without the Taking Condition Declan Smithies  10. Zetetic Seemings and Their Role in Inquiry Verena Wagner  11. Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry John Bengson  Part 3: Seemings and Perception  12. Veridical Perceptual Seemings Elijah Chudnoff  13. Perceptual Seemings and Perceptual Learning Harmen Ghijsen  14. Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti  Part 4: Intellectual Seemings and Intuitions  15. A Priori vs. A Posteriori Justification: The Central Role of Rational Intuitions Bruce Russell  16. Thought Experiments as Tools of Theory Clarification Grace Helton  17. Lessons from Commonsensism for Religious Epistemology Michael Bergmann

O autorze

Kevin McCain is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He has authored and edited several works in epistemology and philosophy of science including the following from Routledge: Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification (2014), Epistemology: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments (2021), (with Kostas Kampourakis) What is Scientific Knowledge? An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology of Science (2019), (with Scott Stapleford) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (2020), and (with Scott Stapleford and Matthias Steup) of Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (2021).

Scott Stapleford is Professor of Philosophy at St. Thomas University in Fredericton, Canada. His publications for Routledge include: Logic Works: A Rigorous Introduction to Formal Logic (with Lorne Falkenstein and Molly Kao, 2022), Hume’s Enquiry: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2021), Berkeley’s Principles: Expanded and Explained (with Tyron Goldschmidt, 2016), and two edited collections: Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain and Matthias Steup, 2021), and Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles (with Kevin McCain, 2020).

Matthias Steup received his Ph.D. from Brown University in 1985. He is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and the author of An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (1996) and numerous articles in epistemology. He is the editor of Knowledge, Truth and Duty (2001) and co-editor of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2005, 2014), A Companion to Epistemology (2010), and Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (Routledge, 2021).