ISBN-13: 9783319936765 / Angielski / Miękka / 2018 / 126 str.
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Smart Grid Definition
1.3 Motivation and Objectives
1.4 Outlines of the Book
Chapter 2 Background and Literature Survey
2.2.1 Smart Grid Reference Model 2.2.3.1 Smart Infrastructure System 2.2.3.2 Smart Management System 2.2.3.3 Smart Protection System 2.3.1 Home Area Networks (HANs) 2.3.2 Neighbourhood Area Networks (NANs) 2.3.3 Vehicle-to-Grid(V2G) Connections 2.3.4 Wide Area Networks (WANs) 2.4.3 False Data Injection (FDI)Attacks 2.5 Smart Grid Security Concern Chapter 3 Security and Privacy Concerns in Smart Grid 3.1 Customer-side Networks Security and Privacy Problems and Related Works 3.3 Power Control System and State Estimation Security Problems and Related Works Chapter 4 Lightweight Security and Privacy Preserving Scheme for Smart Grid Customer-side Networks 4.1 System Model 4.1.1 Network Model 4.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 4.1.3 Design Goals 4.2 Preliminaries 4.2.1 NTRU Cryptographic Scheme 4.2.1.1 NTRU crypto-system 4.2.1.2 NTRU Signature Scheme (NSS) 4.3 The Proposed Scheme 4.3.1 Phase1. Initialization 4.3.2 Phase2. Exchange Message 4.4 Security Analysis 4.5 Performance Evaluation 4.5.1 Communication overhead 4.5.2 Computation complexity Chapter 5 A Lightweight Lattice-based Homomorphic Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for Smart Grid 5.1 System Model 5.1.1 Network Model 5.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 5.1.3 Design Goals 5.3.1 Initialization Phase 5.3.2 Reading Aggregation Phase 5.4 Security Analysis 5.5 Performance Evaluation 5.5.1 Communication Overhead 5.5.2 Computation Overhead Chapter 6 Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Scheme for V2G Connections 6.1 System Model 6.1.1 Network Model 6.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 6.1.3 Design Goals 6.2.1.1 Key generation 6.2.1.2 Encryption 6.2.1.3 Decryption 6.2.1.4 Signing 6.2.1.5 Verification 6.3 The Proposed Scheme 6.3.1 Initialization Phase 6.3.2 Operation Phase 6.3.2.1 Case1. The CC Supply Request 6.3.2.2 Case2. The CC Consume Request 6.3.2.3 Case3. The EV Charge Request 6.3.2.4 Case4. The EV Discharge Request6.5 Performance Evaluation 6.5.1 Communication Complexity 6.5.2 Computation Complexity 6.6 Summary Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation 7.5 Performance Evaluation 7.5.1 Communication Complexity 7.5.2 Computation Complexity 7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
2.2.3.1 Smart Infrastructure System
2.2.3.2 Smart Management System
2.2.3.3 Smart Protection System 2.3.1 Home Area Networks (HANs) 2.3.2 Neighbourhood Area Networks (NANs) 2.3.3 Vehicle-to-Grid(V2G) Connections 2.3.4 Wide Area Networks (WANs) 2.4.3 False Data Injection (FDI)Attacks 2.5 Smart Grid Security Concern Chapter 3 Security and Privacy Concerns in Smart Grid 3.1 Customer-side Networks Security and Privacy Problems and Related Works 3.3 Power Control System and State Estimation Security Problems and Related Works Chapter 4 Lightweight Security and Privacy Preserving Scheme for Smart Grid Customer-side Networks 4.1 System Model 4.1.1 Network Model 4.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 4.1.3 Design Goals 4.2 Preliminaries 4.2.1 NTRU Cryptographic Scheme 4.2.1.1 NTRU crypto-system 4.2.1.2 NTRU Signature Scheme (NSS) 4.3 The Proposed Scheme 4.3.1 Phase1. Initialization 4.3.2 Phase2. Exchange Message 4.4 Security Analysis 4.5 Performance Evaluation 4.5.1 Communication overhead 4.5.2 Computation complexity Chapter 5 A Lightweight Lattice-based Homomorphic Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for Smart Grid 5.1 System Model 5.1.1 Network Model 5.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 5.1.3 Design Goals 5.3.1 Initialization Phase 5.3.2 Reading Aggregation Phase 5.4 Security Analysis 5.5 Performance Evaluation 5.5.1 Communication Overhead 5.5.2 Computation Overhead Chapter 6 Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Scheme for V2G Connections 6.1 System Model 6.1.1 Network Model 6.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 6.1.3 Design Goals 6.2.1.1 Key generation 6.2.1.2 Encryption 6.2.1.3 Decryption 6.2.1.4 Signing 6.2.1.5 Verification 6.3 The Proposed Scheme 6.3.1 Initialization Phase 6.3.2 Operation Phase 6.3.2.1 Case1. The CC Supply Request 6.3.2.2 Case2. The CC Consume Request 6.3.2.3 Case3. The EV Charge Request 6.3.2.4 Case4. The EV Discharge Request6.5 Performance Evaluation 6.5.1 Communication Complexity 6.5.2 Computation Complexity 6.6 Summary Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation 7.5 Performance Evaluation 7.5.1 Communication Complexity 7.5.2 Computation Complexity 7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
2.3.1 Home Area Networks (HANs)
2.3.2 Neighbourhood Area Networks (NANs)
2.3.3 Vehicle-to-Grid(V2G) Connections
2.3.4 Wide Area Networks (WANs)
2.4.3 False Data Injection (FDI)Attacks
2.5 Smart Grid Security Concern
Chapter 3 Security and Privacy Concerns in Smart Grid 3.1 Customer-side Networks Security and Privacy Problems and Related Works
Chapter 3 Security and Privacy Concerns in Smart Grid
3.3 Power Control System and State Estimation Security Problems and Related Works
Chapter 4 Lightweight Security and Privacy Preserving Scheme for Smart Grid Customer-side Networks 4.1 System Model 4.1.1 Network Model 4.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 4.1.3 Design Goals 4.2 Preliminaries 4.2.1 NTRU Cryptographic Scheme 4.2.1.1 NTRU crypto-system 4.2.1.2 NTRU Signature Scheme (NSS) 4.3 The Proposed Scheme 4.3.1 Phase1. Initialization 4.3.2 Phase2. Exchange Message 4.4 Security Analysis 4.5 Performance Evaluation 4.5.1 Communication overhead 4.5.2 Computation complexity Chapter 5 A Lightweight Lattice-based Homomorphic Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for Smart Grid 5.1 System Model 5.1.1 Network Model 5.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 5.1.3 Design Goals 5.3.1 Initialization Phase 5.3.2 Reading Aggregation Phase 5.4 Security Analysis 5.5 Performance Evaluation 5.5.1 Communication Overhead 5.5.2 Computation Overhead Chapter 6 Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Scheme for V2G Connections 6.1 System Model 6.1.1 Network Model 6.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 6.1.3 Design Goals 6.2.1.1 Key generation 6.2.1.2 Encryption 6.2.1.3 Decryption 6.2.1.4 Signing 6.2.1.5 Verification 6.3 The Proposed Scheme 6.3.1 Initialization Phase 6.3.2 Operation Phase 6.3.2.1 Case1. The CC Supply Request 6.3.2.2 Case2. The CC Consume Request 6.3.2.3 Case3. The EV Charge Request 6.3.2.4 Case4. The EV Discharge Request6.5 Performance Evaluation 6.5.1 Communication Complexity 6.5.2 Computation Complexity 6.6 Summary Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation 7.5 Performance Evaluation 7.5.1 Communication Complexity 7.5.2 Computation Complexity 7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
Chapter 4 Lightweight Security and Privacy Preserving Scheme for Smart Grid Customer-side Networks
4.1.1 Network Model
4.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements
4.1.3 Design Goals
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1.1 NTRU crypto-system
4.2.1.2 NTRU Signature Scheme (NSS) 4.3 The Proposed Scheme 4.3.1 Phase1. Initialization 4.3.2 Phase2. Exchange Message 4.4 Security Analysis 4.5 Performance Evaluation 4.5.1 Communication overhead 4.5.2 Computation complexity Chapter 5 A Lightweight Lattice-based Homomorphic Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for Smart Grid 5.1 System Model 5.1.1 Network Model 5.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 5.1.3 Design Goals 5.3.1 Initialization Phase 5.3.2 Reading Aggregation Phase 5.4 Security Analysis 5.5 Performance Evaluation 5.5.1 Communication Overhead 5.5.2 Computation Overhead Chapter 6 Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Scheme for V2G Connections 6.1 System Model 6.1.1 Network Model 6.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 6.1.3 Design Goals 6.2.1.1 Key generation 6.2.1.2 Encryption 6.2.1.3 Decryption 6.2.1.4 Signing 6.2.1.5 Verification 6.3 The Proposed Scheme 6.3.1 Initialization Phase 6.3.2 Operation Phase 6.3.2.1 Case1. The CC Supply Request 6.3.2.2 Case2. The CC Consume Request 6.3.2.3 Case3. The EV Charge Request 6.3.2.4 Case4. The EV Discharge Request6.5 Performance Evaluation 6.5.1 Communication Complexity 6.5.2 Computation Complexity 6.6 Summary Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation 7.5 Performance Evaluation 7.5.1 Communication Complexity 7.5.2 Computation Complexity 7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
4.3 The Proposed Scheme
4.3.2 Phase2. Exchange Message 4.4 Security Analysis 4.5 Performance Evaluation 4.5.1 Communication overhead 4.5.2 Computation complexity Chapter 5 A Lightweight Lattice-based Homomorphic Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for Smart Grid 5.1 System Model 5.1.1 Network Model 5.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 5.1.3 Design Goals 5.3.1 Initialization Phase 5.3.2 Reading Aggregation Phase 5.4 Security Analysis 5.5 Performance Evaluation 5.5.1 Communication Overhead 5.5.2 Computation Overhead Chapter 6 Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Scheme for V2G Connections 6.1 System Model 6.1.1 Network Model 6.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 6.1.3 Design Goals 6.2.1.1 Key generation 6.2.1.2 Encryption 6.2.1.3 Decryption 6.2.1.4 Signing 6.2.1.5 Verification 6.3 The Proposed Scheme 6.3.1 Initialization Phase 6.3.2 Operation Phase 6.3.2.1 Case1. The CC Supply Request 6.3.2.2 Case2. The CC Consume Request 6.3.2.3 Case3. The EV Charge Request 6.3.2.4 Case4. The EV Discharge Request6.5 Performance Evaluation 6.5.1 Communication Complexity 6.5.2 Computation Complexity 6.6 Summary Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation 7.5 Performance Evaluation 7.5.1 Communication Complexity 7.5.2 Computation Complexity 7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
4.4 Security Analysis 4.5 Performance Evaluation 4.5.1 Communication overhead 4.5.2 Computation complexity
4.5 Performance Evaluation
4.5.1 Communication overhead
Chapter 5 A Lightweight Lattice-based Homomorphic Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for Smart Grid 5.1 System Model 5.1.1 Network Model 5.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 5.1.3 Design Goals
Chapter 5 A Lightweight Lattice-based Homomorphic Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme for Smart Grid
5.1 System Model
5.1.1 Network Model
5.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements
5.3.2 Reading Aggregation Phase 5.4 Security Analysis 5.5 Performance Evaluation 5.5.1 Communication Overhead 5.5.2 Computation Overhead Chapter 6 Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Scheme for V2G Connections 6.1 System Model 6.1.1 Network Model 6.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements 6.1.3 Design Goals 6.2.1.1 Key generation 6.2.1.2 Encryption 6.2.1.3 Decryption 6.2.1.4 Signing 6.2.1.5 Verification 6.3 The Proposed Scheme 6.3.1 Initialization Phase 6.3.2 Operation Phase 6.3.2.1 Case1. The CC Supply Request 6.3.2.2 Case2. The CC Consume Request 6.3.2.3 Case3. The EV Charge Request 6.3.2.4 Case4. The EV Discharge Request6.5 Performance Evaluation 6.5.1 Communication Complexity 6.5.2 Computation Complexity 6.6 Summary Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation 7.5 Performance Evaluation 7.5.1 Communication Complexity 7.5.2 Computation Complexity 7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
5.4 Security Analysis 5.5 Performance Evaluation 5.5.1 Communication Overhead 5.5.2 Computation Overhead
5.5 Performance Evaluation
5.5.1 Communication Overhead
Chapter 6 Lightweight Authentication and Privacy-Preserving Scheme for V2G Connections
6.1.1 Network Model
6.1.2 Adversary Model and Security Requirements
6.1.3 Design Goals 6.2.1.1 Key generation 6.2.1.2 Encryption 6.2.1.3 Decryption 6.2.1.4 Signing 6.2.1.5 Verification 6.3 The Proposed Scheme 6.3.1 Initialization Phase 6.3.2 Operation Phase 6.3.2.1 Case1. The CC Supply Request 6.3.2.2 Case2. The CC Consume Request 6.3.2.3 Case3. The EV Charge Request 6.3.2.4 Case4. The EV Discharge Request6.5 Performance Evaluation 6.5.1 Communication Complexity 6.5.2 Computation Complexity 6.6 Summary Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation 7.5 Performance Evaluation 7.5.1 Communication Complexity 7.5.2 Computation Complexity 7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
6.2.1.1 Key generation
6.2.1.2 Encryption
6.2.1.3 Decryption
6.2.1.4 Signing
6.3 The Proposed Scheme
6.3.1 Initialization Phase 6.3.2 Operation Phase 6.3.2.1 Case1. The CC Supply Request 6.3.2.2 Case2. The CC Consume Request 6.3.2.3 Case3. The EV Charge Request 6.3.2.4 Case4. The EV Discharge Request6.5 Performance Evaluation 6.5.1 Communication Complexity 6.5.2 Computation Complexity 6.6 Summary Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation 7.5 Performance Evaluation 7.5.1 Communication Complexity 7.5.2 Computation Complexity 7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
6.3.2 Operation Phase
6.3.2.2 Case2. The CC Consume Request
6.3.2.3 Case3. The EV Charge Request
6.3.2.4 Case4. The EV Discharge Request6.5 Performance Evaluation 6.5.1 Communication Complexity 6.5.2 Computation Complexity 6.6 Summary Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation 7.5 Performance Evaluation 7.5.1 Communication Complexity 7.5.2 Computation Complexity 7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
6.5 Performance Evaluation
6.5.1 Communication Complexity
6.5.2 Computation Complexity 6.6 Summary Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation 7.5 Performance Evaluation 7.5.1 Communication Complexity 7.5.2 Computation Complexity 7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
6.6 Summary
Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid 7.1 System Model 7.1.1 Network Model 7.1.2 Adversary Model 7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase 7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission 7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units 7.3.2.3 Operation for state estimation
Chapter 7 Efficient Prevention Technique for False Data Injection Attack in Smart Grid
7.1 System Model
7.1.1 Network Model
7.1.3 Security Requirements and Design Goals 7.2 Preliminaries 7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem 7.2.1.1 Notions 7.2.1.2 Key generation 7.2.1.3 Encryption 7.2.1.4 Decryption 7.3 The Proposed Scheme 7.3.1 Initialization phase
7.2 Preliminaries
7.2.1 McEliece cryptosystem
7.2.1.1 Notions
7.2.1.2 Key generation
7.2.1.3 Encryption
7.2.1.4 Decryption
7.3 The Proposed Scheme
7.3.2.1 Operation for transmission
7.3.2.2 Operation for compromised units
7.5 Performance Evaluation
7.5.1 Communication Complexity
7.5.3 State Estimator Performance Evaluation 7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
7.6 Case Study 7.7 Summary Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
7.7 Summary
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 8.1 Conclusions 8.2 Further Research Topics
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work
8.2 Further Research Topics
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