Rules and Reason: Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy

ISBN-13: 9780521659598 / Angielski / Miękka / 2001 / 336 str.

Ram Mudambi; Pietro Navarra; Giuseppe Sobbrio

Opis

Polarization in Western democracies and the collapse of centrally planned economies have led to calls for a redefinition of the state's core functions. This collection explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy anchoring the state from the viewpoints of theory, systems, and applications, with a view toward identifying why changes may be desirable and how these might be implemented. Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan offers a foreword to the work and coauthors a chapter on theory of constitutional rules.

Recenzje

'… a significant scholarly contribution …'. Political Studies Review

Spis treści

Foreword James M. Buchanan; 1. Constitutional issues in modern democracies Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio; 2. On writing a constitution Dennis C. Mueller; 3. Constitutional order and economic evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic societies Viktor Vanberg; 4. The efficacy of arbitrary rules James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon; 5. Constitutional political economy and civil society Charles K. Rowley; 6. The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution Nicolaus Tiseman; 7. Ideological competition and institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not nonsense Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger; 8. Electoral systems and the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds; 9. Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements Pierre Salmon; 10. The cost imposed on political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of Italian National Elections Ram Mudambi, Peitro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio; 11. A model of two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections and evidence Chris W. Paul II and Allen W. Wilhite; 12. Ensuring a stable Federal State: economics or political institutional design Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshokk and Olga V. Shevetsova; 13. A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOCJ Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger; 14. The Maastricht 'excessive deficit' rules and creative accounting Francesco Forte; 15. Subsidiarity, federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a Federal European Constitution Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.