Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory

ISBN-13: 9781137541802 / Angielski / Twarda / 2016 / 271 str.

Marcus Arvan

Opis

Moral philosophy today is marked by profound, systematic disagreement. In Rightness as Fairness, Marcus Arvan argues that moral philosophy must adapt scientific principles of theory-selection in order to reliably uncover moral truth. Arvan then argues that our best empirical evidence and naturalistic observation reveal morality to be a type of prudence requiring us to act in ways that our present and future selves can rationally agree upon across time. Arvan shows that this agreement Rightness as Fairness requires us to be fair to ourselves and to others, including animals. Further, the Four Principles of Fairness comprising this agreement reconcile a variety of traditionally opposed moral and political frameworks. Finally,"

Recenzje

"Marcus Arvan's Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory is a recent work in normative ethics that makes an interesting and worthwhile contribution to the field ... . It is written in an analytical style, its position is clear and its arguments are structured and expressed well throughout the text. ... I would especially recommend it to readers interested in normative ethics and instrumentalism." (Liam Moore, Res Publica, Vol. 23, 2017)

Spis treści

List of Tables
Acknowledgements
INTRODUCTION
PART I: ETHICS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
1. Distinguishing Truth from Seeming-Truth
2. Seven Principles of Theory-Selection
2.1. Firm Foundations
2.2. Internal Coherence
2.3. External Coherence
2.4. Explanatory Power
2.5. Unity
2.6. Parsimony
2.7. Fruitfulness
3. The Case for Instrumentalism
3.1. The Firmest Foundation
3.2. The Promise of Parsimony, Unity, Explanatory Power, and Fruitfulness
3.3. Advantages over Alternatives
3.3.1. Advantages over Intuitionism
3.3.2. Advantages over Reflective Equilibrium
3.3.3. Advantages over Moral-Language Analysis
3.3.4. Advantages over Constitutivism
3.3.5. Advantages over Second and Third-Personalism
3.3.6. Advantages over Sterba's Dialecticalism
3.3.7. Conclusion
4. Disarming Initial Concerns
4.1. The Wrong Kinds of Reasons?
4.2. Not a Firm Foundation?
4.3. Unconvincing and Artificial?
4.4. Three Promissory Notes
4.4.1. Not the Wrong Kinds of Reasons?
4.4.2. Firm Foundations After All?
4.4.3. Convincing and Intuitive?
5. Conclusion
PART II: THE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SELVES
1. Our Capacities to Care about Our Past and Future
2. The Problem of Possible Future Selves
2.1. Possible Futures
2.2. Possible Psychologies
2.3. Possible Choices
2.4. A Very Real Problem
3. Morality as the Solution?
4. Is the Problem Too Contingent?
5. Two Nonsolutions
5.1. Nonsolution 1: Probable Futures
5.2. Nonsolution 2: Diachronic Motivational Consistency
6. Conclusion: An Unsolved Problem
PART III: THE CATEGORICAL-INSTRUMENTAL IMPERATIVE
1. Interests in Diachronic Cooperation
2. Three Types of Interests
2.1. Involuntary Interests
2.2. Semivoluntary Interests
2.3. Voluntary Interests
3. The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative
4. Just Conscience?
5. An Intuitive Solution to the Problem of Possible Future Selves?
6. Conclusion
PART IV: THREE UNIFIED FORMULATIONS
1. The Humanity-and-Sentience Formulation
1.1. Possible Other-Human-Regarding Interests
1.2. Possible Nonhuman-Animal-Regarding Interests
1.3. Possible Sentient-Being-Regarding Interests
1.4. Derivation of the Humanity-and-Sentience Formulation
2. The Kingdom-of-Human-and-Sentient-Ends Formulation
3. Advantages over Kantian Ethics
3.1. Firmer Foundations
3.2. Greater Internal Coherence
3.3. Greater External Coherence
3.4. Greater Explanatory Power, Unity and Parsimony
3.5. Greater Fruitfulness
4. Conclusion
PART V: THE MORAL ORIGINAL POSITION
1. Rawls' Original Position
1.1. Rawls' Kantian Rationale
1.2. Rawls' Reflective-Equilibrium Rationale
1.3. Rawls' Public Reason Rationale
2. Some Common Critiques
2.1. Kantian Critiques
2.2. Reflective-Equilibrium Critiques
2.3. Public Reason Critiques
3. The Case for a Moral Original Position
4. Corroborating the Critiques
4.1. Corroborating Kantian Critiques
4.2. Corroborating Reflective-Equilibrium Critiques
4.3. Corroborating Public Reason Critiques
5. Conclusion
PART VI: RIGHTNESS AS FAIRNESS
1. Derivation of Four Principles of Fairness
1.1. The Principle of Negative Fairness
1.2. The Principle of Positive Fairness
1.3. The Principle of Fair Negotiation
1.4. The Principle of Virtues of Fairness
2. Rightness as Fairness: A Unified Standard of Right and Wrong
3. Rightness as Fairness in Practice: Principled Fair Negotiation
3.1. Kant's Four Cases
3.2. How Numbers Should Count: Trolleys, Torture, and Unwilling Organ Donors
3.3. World Poverty
3.4. Distribution of Scarce Medical Resources
3.5. The Ethical Treatment of Animals
4. Conclusion
PART VII: LIBERTARIAN EGALITARIAN COMMUNITARIANISM
1. Libertarianism, Egalitarianism, and Communitarianism
1.1. Libertarianism: Attractions and Critiques
1.2. Egalitarianism: Attractions and Critiques
1.3. Egalitarianism: Attractions and Critiques
2. The Case for Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism
3. Additional Advantages
3.1. (Qualified) Fair Negotiation over Divisiveness
3.2. Resolving the Scope and Requirements of Justice
3.3. Resolving the Ideal-Nonideal Theory Distinction
4. Conclusion
PART VIII: EVALUATING RIGHTNESS AS FAIRNESS
1. Firmer Foundations
2. Greater Internal Coherence
3. Greater External Coherence
4. Greater Explanatory Power5. Greater Unity
6. Greater Parsimony
7. Greater Fruitfulness
8. Conclusion
References
Bibliography
Index

O autorze

Marcus Arvan is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tampa, US. He works primarily in ethics and social-political philosophy, as well as metaphysics and philosophy of science. His work has appeared in various journals including Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, and The Philosophical Forum.

Blurb

Moral philosophy today is marked by profound, systematic disagreement. In Rightness as Fairness, Marcus Arvan argues that the field of moral philosophy must adapt scientific principles in order to move closer to discovering moral truth. Arvan argues that our best empirical evidence and natural observation reveal morality to be a type of prudence requiring us to act in ways that our present and future selves can rationally agree upon across time. Arvan shows that this agreement between our present and future selves - Rightness as Fairness - is fundamentally a matter of being fair to ourselves and to others, including animals. Further, the Four Principles of Fairness comprising this agreement reconcile several opposing moral and political frameworks, including libertarianism and egalitarianism. Rightness as Fairness provides a uniquely fruitful method of 'principled fair negotiation' for resolving applied moral and political issues that requires merging principled debate with real-world negotiation.