Rejecting Compromise: Legislators' Fear of Primary Voters

ISBN-13: 9781108487955 / Angielski / Twarda / 2020 / 182 str.

Sarah E. Anderson; Daniel Butler; Laurel Harbridge-Yong

Opis

This analysis of legislative behavior shows how primary voters can obstruct political compromise and outlines potential reforms to remedy gridlock.

Recenzje

'Anderson, Butler, and Harbridge-Yong make a compelling case that the threat of electoral punishment by primary voters is deterring politicians from supporting compromise policy proposals. This book also makes an important contribution to the broader debate over the mechanisms and consequences of polarization - the effects of elite perceptions of primary voters on legislative behavior is a critically important topic that has received too little scholarly attention.' Brendan Nyhan, Professor of Government, Dartmouth College

Spis treści

1. Rejecting compromise, getting gridlock; 2. Legislators reject half-loaf compromises; 3. Legislators reject half-loaf compromises because they fear voter retribution; 4. Primary voters as the source of punishment; 5. Voter punishment is rare but real; 6. Structuring negotiations in the shadow of primary voter punishment; 7. Compromise, voter punishment in primaries, and legislative gridlock; References.