"Urquidez carefully works through a massive body of literature and thought, and offers a compelling critique of the overlapping discursive spheres that will appeal to critics on various levels." (George N. Fourlas, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 24, 2021)
"(Re-) Defining Racism is a very smart and well-written book that I think Alberto Urquidez should be extremely proud to have written. The book covers an impressive amount of literature, both in philosophy of language ... and philosophy of race." (José Jorge Mendoza, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 24, 2021) "Alberto G. Urquidez's (Re-) Defining Racism, is a masterful work in conceptual explication ... . Urquidez has contributed a great deal to the academic philosophical tradition of Philosophy of Race and others will doubtless take up extensive discussion of many aspects of this seminal work." (Naomi Zack, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 24, 2021)
Part I: Racism Without Ontology
Ch.1. Introduction: Summary of the Argument
Ch. 2. Introduction: Toward a Conventionalist Framework
Ch. 3. Re-defining “Definition”: An Argument for Conventionalism
Ch. 4. Re-defining “Meaning”: Defending Semantic Internalism Over Externalism
Part II: Theorizing Conceptual Disagreement
Ch. 5. Re-defining “Disagreement”: Rationality Without Final Solutions
Ch. 6. Re-defining “Philosophical Analysis”: Not Descriptive Analysis, Or Conservatism, But Pragmatic Revisionism
Part III: Toward a Prescriptive Theory of Racism
Ch. 7. Adequacy Conditions for a Prescriptive Theory of Racism: Toward an Oppression-Centered Account
Ch. 8. Racial Oppression and Grammatical Pluralism: A Critique of Jorge Garcia on Racist belief
Ch. 9. Concluding Note
Alberto G. Urquidez is currently a CFD Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy at Bowdoin College, USA. .
What is racism? is a timely question that is hotly contested in the philosophy of race. Yet disagreement about racism’s nature does not begin in philosophy, but in the sociopolitical domain. Alberto G. Urquidez argues that philosophers of race have failed to pay sufficient attention to the practical considerations that prompt the question “What is racism?” Most theorists assume that “racism” signifies a language-independent phenomenon that needs to be “discovered” by the relevant science or “uncovered” by close scrutiny of everyday usage of this term. (Re-)Defining Racism challenges this metaphysical paradigm. Urquidez develops a Wittgenstein-inspired framework that illuminates the use of terms like “definition,” “meaning,” “explanation of meaning,” and “disagreement,” for the analysis of contested normative concepts. These elucidations reveal that providing a definition of “racism” amounts to recommending a form of moral representation—a rule for the correct use of “racism.” As definitional recommendations must be justified on pragmatic grounds, Urquidez takes as a starting point for justification the interests of racism's historical victims.