Public Pensions and Economic Growth

ISBN-13: 9783642077593 / Angielski / Miękka / 2010 / 164 str.

Berthold U. Wigger

Opis

This book studies the normative and positive ramifications of public pension policies in a growing economy. It analyzes the impact of an unfunded public pension scheme on aggregate productivity growth and efficiency, it considers the political forces behind public pension legislation, and it develops and discusses elements of public pension design and reform. The book emphasizes the endogenous growth paradigm for an understanding of the dynamic impact of intergenerational transfers inherent in an unfunded public pension scheme. It uncovers an allocative role of intergenerational transfers which is exclusively linked to the possibility of endogenously evolving economic growth. The endogenous growth approach also allows to identify unfunded public pensions as a source of a conflict between current and future generations. This conflict shapes private old-age security considerations as well as the process of public pension legislation.

Recenzje

From the reviews:

"This book ... consists of a collection of papers that deal with the effect the assumption of endogenous growth has on the functioning of public-pension plans. ... This book is well written and I enjoyed reading it. To those who want to have a quick refresher course in the effects of public-pension schemes in growth models, this book is highly recommended. ... I recommend this book as a compact survey and as a possible source of inspiration for those wish to begin research ... ." (H. A. A. Verbon, Journal of Economics, Vol. 80 (2), 2003)

Spis treści

1. Introduction.- 2. Public Pensions and Economic Growth: The Basic Framework.- 2.1. The Analytical Elements.- 2.1.1. The Individuals.- 2.1.2. The Firms.- 2.1.3. The Public Pension Program.- 2.1.4. The Competitive Equilibrium.- 2.2. Productivity Growth.- 2.3. Allocative Efficiency.- 2.4. Public Pension Reform.- Appendix 2.- 3. The Allocative Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Endogenous Growth Economies.- 3.1. Investment Externalities, Intergenerational Transfers, and Pareto-improvements.- 3.1.1. A Subsidy to Private Savings.- 3.1.2. A Pareto-Improving Policy.- 3.2. The Length of the Working Life.- 3.2.1. A Two-Period Model without Retirement.- 3.2.2. A Three-Period Model with Retirement.- 3.3. Endogenous Innovation.- 3.4. Human Capital Formation.- 3.4.1. Externalities from Human Capital Formation.- 3.4.2. An Optimal Public Pension Scheme.- Appendix 3.- 4. Public versus Private Intergenerational Transfers.- 4.1. Dynastic Altruism.- 4.2. Gifts, Bequests, and Growth.- 4.3. When Are Private Intergenerational Transfers Operative?.- 4.4. Old-Age Security and Neutrality.- 4.5. Legislating Public Pensions (I).- 4.5.1. The Political Equilibrium.- 4.5.2. An Intergenerational Conflict.- 4.5.3. The Role of Population Growth.- 4.5.4. Concluding Remarks.- Appendix 4.- 5. The Family as an Old-age Security Device.- 5.1. A Twofold Fertility Motive.- 5.2. The Interplay between Productivity Growth and Fertility.- 5.2.1. Operative Intrafamily Transfers.- 5.2.2. Productivity Growth.- 5.2.3. Fertility.- 5.2.4. The Economy’s Growth Factor.- 5.3. Legislating Public Pensions (II).- 5.3.1. The Political Equilibrium.- 5.3.2. Reduced Joy of Having Children.- 5.3.3. A Numerical Example.- Appendix 5.- 6. Summary.- List of Symbols.- References.- Author Index.