Symposium: Theoretical Entities in Statistical Explanation.- Theoretical Entities in Statistical Explanation.- Explanation and Relevance: Comments on James G. Greeno’s ‘Theoretical Entities in Statistical Explanation’.- Remarks on Explanatory Power.- Symposium: Capacities and Natures.- Capacities and Natures.- Capacities and Natures: An Exercise in Ontology.- Fisk on Capacities and Natures.- Symposium: History of Science and its Rational Reconstruction.- History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions.- Notes on Lakatos.- Research Programmes and Induction.- Can We Use the History of Science to Decide Between Competing Methodologies?.- Inter-Theoretic Criticism and the Growth of Science.- Replies to Critics.- Contributed Papers.- I. Observation.- Observation.- Feyerabend’s Pragmatic Theory of Observation and the Comparability of Alternative Theories.- Observations as the Building Blocks of Science in 20th-Century Scientific Thought.- II. Philosophical Problems of Biology.- Functionalism and the Negative Feedback Model in Biology.- Some Problems with the Concept of ‘Feedback’.- Articulation of Parts Explanation in Biology and the Rational Search for Them.- III. Equivalence, Analyticity, and In-Principle Confirmability.- Theoretical Realism and Theoretical Equivalence.- Theoretical Analyticity.- The Confirmation Machine.- IV. Probability, Statistics and Acceptance.- Unknown Probabilities, Bayesianism, and de Finetti’s Representation Theorem.- New Dimensions of Confirmation Theory II: The Structure of Uncertainty.- Cost-Benefit vs Expected Utility Acceptance Rules.- Material Conditions on Tests of Statistical Hypotheses.- V. Problems in Quantum Physics; Genetic Epistemology.- Tachyons, Backwards Causation, and Freedom.- The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox Reexamined.- The Significance of Piaget’s Researches on the Psychogenesis of Atomism.- VI. Theoretical Pluralism; Understanding; Methodological Agreement.- Method and Factual Agreement in Science.- VII. Induction and Reduction.- Dispositional Probabilities.- On the Relation of Neurological and Psychological Theories: A Critique of the Hardware Thesis.- ‘Self-supporting’ Inductive Arguments.- VIII. Scientific Theories: Comparison and Change.- Ontological and Terminological Commitment and the Methodological Commensurability of Theories.- Objectivity, Scientific Change, and Self-Reference.- A Logical Empiricist Theory of Scientific Change?.- IX. The Future of Philosophy of Science; Theory in the Social Sciences.- The Structure, Growth and Application of Scientific Knowledge: Reflections on Relevance and the Future of Philosophy of Science.- From Logical Systems to Conceptual Populations.- Two Kinds of Theory in the Social Sciences.- X. Relativity and Congruence.- Einstein and the Lorentz-Poincaré Theory of Relativity.- Competing Radical Translations: Examples, Limitations and Implications.- Is ‘Congruence’ A Peculiar Predicate?.