Introduction.- Part 1. Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness.- Chapter 1. Preliminary Remarks.- Chapter 2. Phenomenological Reduction and Suspension of Objective Time.- Part 2. Phenomenological Analysis of Retentional Consciousness.- Chapter 3. Retention or Primary Memory.- Part 4. Phenomenological Analysis of Protentional Consciousness.- Chapter 4. Protention as Phenomenon.- Chapter 5. Elements of a Material Analysis of Protention.- Chapter 6. Protention and Affectivity — The Affective Relief.- Chapter 7. Protention and Instincts.- Chapter 8. Experiential Elements of the Affective Relief and the Role of Protention.- Chapter 9. Conclusions.- Index.
Nikos Soueltzis completed his PhD in philosophy at the University of Patras, Greece, in 2017. While he was working on his PhD, he visited the Husserl Archives at the University of Cologne as guest researcher. As a PhD student, he participated in a research project on “Habit and Skill” financed by the Greek General Secretariat of Research and Technology. In 2017 he was awarded the Directors’ Memorial Prize offered by the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology (CARP) at the 48thHusserl Circle Annual Meeting. He has served as adjunct lecturer at the University of Patras and at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. He has translated in Greek Husserl’s Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (Crete University Press, forthcoming) and is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Crete working on his personal project: “Time and Body. The experience of bodily temporality as the basis of body’s physicality: a phenomenological analysis,” financed by the Greek State Scholarship Foundation (IKY). His main research interests include: phenomenology of time-consciousness and memory, phenomenology of bodily awareness, phenomenology of self-awareness. He currently explores the broad region of phenomena that fall under the rubric of “bodily temporality.”
Every attempt to examine our consciousness’s passive life and its dynamic in its various forms inevitably intersects with our primal awareness of the future. Even though Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness enjoys a certain fame, his conception of our primordial relation to the future has not been adequately accounted for.
The book at hand aims to offer a close study of Husserl’s view of protentional consciousness and to trace its unique contribution to our overall awareness of time. It offers an extensive analysis of various aspects of protention by investigating its connection to different fields and levels of experience. To achieve such a task, the book stresses the need to enrich the familiar formal account of protention with a material one. Thus, alongside issues pertaining exclusively to the form of protention, such as its relation to fulfillment as well as its double-intentional structure, various other dimensions are discussed, such as the phenomena of disappointment and correction as well as the role hyle plays in both of them. In the same vein, special attention is given to the relation between protentional consciousness and affectivity, thus shedding light on the dynamic unity of our living-present.
What this study purports to show is that Husserl’s phenomenology is equipped to offer a solid account of the thinnest and subtlest ways in which we are aware of the future in our experiential life.