Peter of Ailly: Concepts and Insolubles: An Annotated Translation

ISBN-13: 9789400989955 / Angielski / Miękka / 2011 / 196 str.

P. V. Spade

Opis

2 Peter of Aillyl wrote his Concepts and Insolubles, according to the best 3 estimate, in 1372. He was at that time only about twenty-two years old. He was born around 1350" in Compiegne in the De de France, although his 5 family name associates him with the village of Ailly in Picardy. In 1364 he entered the University of Paris as a 'bursar' (i. e., the recipient of a scholarship) at the College de Navarre. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1367 and taught there until 1368, when he entered the Faculty of Theology. He became a Doctor of Theology in 1381. In the years that followed, Peter was very active in the 'conciliar' movement and in negotiations to bring about the end of the Great Schism of the West. He was elevated to the rank of Cardinal in 1411 by Pope John XXIII, the successor of Alexander V in the 'Pisa' line of Popes. He took an active part in the Council of Constance (1414-1418), which ended the Great Schism and elected Pope Martin V. Peter died on August 9, 1420. Most of the secondary literature on Peter of Ailly concerns his role in church politics, his writings on the Schism and on ecclesiastical reform, and various aspects of his theology. But Peter was active in a number of other areas as well. He wrote several works, for instance, on geography and astron 6 omy, including an Imago mundi read by Christopher Columbus."

Spis treści

Translation.- Concepts.- I. Introductory considerations (pars. 1–9).- A. Division of terms into mental, spoken and written (par. 1).- B. General definition of ‘Term’ (pars. 1–3).- C. Analysis of the phrase ‘vital change’ (pars. 4–7).- D. Two senses of ‘to be a sign of some thing’ (pars. 8–9).- II. Mental terms (pars. 10–54).- A. Complex and incomplex mental terms (par. 10).- B. Categorematic and syncategorematic mental terms, in signification and in function (pars. 11–15).- C. Mental terms properly and improperly so called (pars. 16–20).- D. First and second intentions (pars. 21–30).- E. Mental terms properly so called signify naturally only (par. 31).- F. Two senses of ‘to signify naturally’ (pars. 32–33).- G. Mental terms syncategorematic in signification (par. 34).- H. Against the modistae (pars. 35–40).- I. Absolute and connotative mental terms properly so called (pars. 41–54).- a. The connotation of the term ‘concept’ (pars. 51–54).- III. Spoken terms (pars. 55–88).- A. Analysis of the phrase ‘utterance that signifies by convention’ (pars. 55–62).- B. Ultimate and non-ultimate conventional signification (pars. 63–68).- a. Supposition of spoken terms and mental terms properly so called (pars. 67–68).- C. Categorematic and syncategorematic spoken terms (pars. 69–73).- D. Spoken terms of first and second imposition or intention (pars. 74–80).- E. Absolute and connotative spoken terms (par. 81).- F. Against the modistae (pars. 82–88).- IV. Written terms and mental terms improperly so called (par. 89).- Insolubles.- I. Introduction (pars. 90–91).- A. Program of the treatise (par. 91).- II. Chapter One: What a sentence is (pars. 92–137).- A. Program of Ch. 1 (par. 92).- B. Subordination among spoken, written and mental sentences (par. 93).- C. Mental sentences properly and improperly so called (pars. 94–96).- D. Descriptions of various senses of ‘sentence’ (pars. 97–98).- E. Are mental sentences properly so called composed of parts? (pars. 99–137).- 1. Introductory remarks (par. 99).- 2. Gregory of Rimini’s view: They are never composites (pars. 100–111).- 3. Peter’s own view (pars. 112–137).- a. Introductory remarks (par. 112).- b. The composition or non-composition of mental sentences properly so called (pars. 113–128).- i. Conclusion 1: Mental hypothetical are composites (pars. 113–118).- ii. Conclusion 2: Mental categoricals are not composites (pars. 119–124).- iii. Conclusion 3: Mental expressions ought not be called ‘complex’ because they are really composites (pars. 125–128).- c. Why a mental expression should be called complex (pars. 129–136).- i. Conclusion 4: Not because it is equivalent in signifying to the several utterances or inscriptions that make up a spoken or written expression (pars. 129–130).- ii. Conclusion 5: Not-because it signifies a composition or division among beings (pars. 131–134).- iii. Conclusion 6: Rather because it is equivalent in signifying to several acts of knowing (pars. 135–136).- d. Closing remarks (par. 137).- III. Chapter Two: Truth and falsehood in general (pars. 138–238).- A. Introductory remarks (pars. 138–139).- B. Bad reasons for calling sentences true or false (pars. 140–147).- 1. Conclusion 1: Because they signify what is true or false externally (pars. 140–143).- 2. Conclusion 2: Because of the supposition of their subjects and predicates (pars. 144–147).- C. Why sentences signifying by convention should be called true or false, possible or impossible (pars. 148–157).- 1. Conclusion 3: Their truth or falsehood is based on the truth or falsehood of a corresponding mental sentence properly so called (pars. 148–152).- a. Corollary 1: A conventionally signifying sentence can be true and false at the same time (par. 150).- b. Corollary 2: Such a sentence is distinct from its own truth or falsehood (par. 151).- c. Objection to Corollary 1, with reply (par. 152).- 2. Conclusion 4: The possibility or impossibility of such sentences is based on the possibility or impossibility of a corresponding mental sentence properly so called (pars. 153–157).- a. Corollary 1: The spoken sentence ‘No spoken sentence is true’ is possible (par. 155).- b. Corollary 2: But it cannot be true (par. 156).- c. Problem and reply (par. 157).- D. Why mental sentences properly so called are true or false, possible or impossible (pars. 158–178).- 1. Introduction to Conclusions 5 and 6 (par. 158).- 2. Conclusion 5: Rule for truth and falsehood of mental sentences properly so called (pars. 159–164).- a. Corollary 1: The cause of the truth of an affirmative is not the same as the cause of the falsehood of the corresponding negative (par. 161).- b. Corollary 2: No mental sentence properly so called can be true and false at the same time (par. 162).- c. Corollary 3: Mental sentences properly so called are identical with their truth or falsehood (par. 163).- d. Corollary 4: The cause of the truth or falsehood of such sentences is the same as the cause of their modal quality (par. 164).- 3. Conclusion 6: Rule for possibility and impossibility of mental sentences properly so called (pars. 165–166).- 4. Further clarification of Conclusions 5 and 6 (pars. 167–170).- 5. Corollaries from Conclusions 4 and 6 (pars. 171–178).- a. Corollary 1 (par. 171).- b. Corollary 2 (pars. 172–174).- i. Objection to Corollary 2, with reply (pars. 173–174).- c. Corollary 3 (par. 175).- d. Corollary 4 (pars. 176–178).- i. Objection to Corollary 4, with reply (par.178).- E. Three doubts about the total significate of a sentence (pars. 179–238).- 1. First doubt: What is the total or adequate significate of ‘Every man is an animal’? (par.179).- 2. Second doubt: It seems that there is something true or false besides true or false sentences (pars. 180–182).- a. First argument: E.g., God and God’s knowledge (par. 180).- b. Second argument: Before the creation, it was true that the world was going to exist (par. 181).- c. Third argument: If no sentence existed, it would be true that no sentence existed (par. 182).- 3. Third doubt: Something impossible must be the significate of an impossible sentence (par. 183).- 4. Program for the rest of Chapter two (par. 184).- 5. Gregory of Rimini’s theory of ‘complexly significables’ (pars. 185–189).- 6. Refutation of Gregory’s view (pars. 190–209).- a. Conclusion 1: There are no complexly significables in Gregory’s sense (pars. 191–195).- b. Conclusion 2: Everything is, in a sense, complexly significable (pars. 196–197).- c. Conclusion 3: Nothing is the adequate or total significate of a mental sentence properly so called (pars. 198–199).- d. Conclusion 4: A mental sentence properly so called signifies exactly what its parts signify, or the parts of the corresponding spoken sentence. Yet the sentence as a whole signifies in some way that is not signified by any part (pars. 200–201).- e. Conclusion 5: Contradictory sentences signify exactly the same things, but in different ways (pars. 202–203).- f. Conclusion 6: No dictum of a mental sentence properly so called supposits for anything if taken significatively (pars. 204–209).- 7. Reply to doubts (pars. 210–238).- a. To the first doubt, in par. 179: Nothing is the total significate (pars. 210–221).- i. How to treat infinitives (pars. 213–221).- ?. Conclusion 1 (pars. 213–215).- ?. Conclusion 2 (pars. 216–218).- ?. Conclusion 3 (par. 219).- ?. Conclusion 4: Infinitives should be used only where ‘that’-clauses can be used (pars. 220–221).- b. To the second doubt, in pars. 180–182 (pars. 222–234).- i. Created and uncreated truths (pars. 222–228).- ?. Conclusion 1: There is a truth outside the soul in addition to created sentences (pars. 222–223).- ?. Conclusion 2: There is no truth outside the soul besides created and uncreated sentences (pars. 224– 225).- ?. Conclusion 3: God is a true sentence (pars. 226–228).- ii. Reply to first argument, in par. 180: God is an uncreated sentence (par. 229).- iii. Reply to second argument, in par. 181: That truth was then God (pars. 230–231).- iv. Reply to third argument, in par. 182: The antecedent is impossible (pars. 232–234).- ?. Objection and reply: What about eternal falsehoods? (pars. 233–234).- c. To the third doubt, in par. 183 (pars. 235–238).- i. One reply: The inference is invalid (par. 235).- ii. An alternative reply: To concede the inference and to deny that it requires the existence of impossibles (pars. 236–237).- iii. Comparison of the two replies: The first is preferable (par. 238).- IV. Chapter Three: Sentences having reflection on themselves (pars. 239–336).- A. Introductory remarks (par. 239).- B. Descriptions (pars. 240–252).- 1. Description 1: Signification (par. 240).- 2. Description 2: Sentence having reflection on itself (par. 241).- 3. Description 3: Insoluble sentence (par. 242).- 4. Corollaries from descriptions (pars. 243–252).- a. Corollary 1: Self–reference requires a term signifying a sentence (par. 243).- b. Refutation of earlier views (pars. 244–252).- i. Corollary 2: Not every sentence signifies itself to be true (pars. 244–246).- ii. Corollary 3: Against Marsilius of Inghen (pars. 247–248).- iii. Corollary 4: Not every sentence has two significations, one material and one formal, against Marsilius (pars. 249–250).- iv. Corollary 5: Against Marsilius (par. 251).- v. Corollary 6: Many sentences thought to be insolubles are not, against Marsilius and others (par. 252).- C. Distinctions: Various kinds of self-reference (pars. 253–261).- 1. Distinction 1: Some self–referential sentences signify themselves to be false, others do not (pars. 253–254).- 2. Distinction 2: Some of the former do so independently of every situation, others do not (pars. 255–256).- 3. Distinction 3: Some of the former do so directly, others indirectly (par. 257).- 4. Distinction 4: Some of the latter do so immediately, others by means of others sentences (par. 258).- 5. Distinction 5: Some of the latter do so by means of sentences they themselves signify, others rather by means of sentence by which they are signified to exist (par. 259).- 6. Distinction 6: Some of the former do so by means of sentences of which they are parts, others do not (par. 260).- 7. Summary (par. 261).- D. Corollaries from distinctions (pars. 262–271).- 1. Corollary 1 (par. 262).- 2. Corollary 2 (pars. 263–270).- a. Objection and reply (pars. 264–270).- 3. Corollary 3 (par. 271).- E. Which kinds of sentences can have reflection on themselves? (pars. 272–336).- 1. Introductory remarks (par. 272).- 2. Assumptions about formal and objective signification (pars. 273–280).- a. Assumption 1: Two kinds of signification: objective and formal (par. 273).- b. Assumption 2: Definition of each kind (par. 274).- c. Assumption 3: Anything can signify itself objectively (par.275).- d. Assumption 4: Nothing can distinctly signify itself formally (pars. 276–277).- e. Assumption 5: Spoken and written sentences signify only objectively (par. 278).- f. Assumption 6: Spoken and written sentences signify themselves first of all (pars. 279–280).- 3. The impossibility of self-reference among mental sentences properly so called (pars. 281–336).- a. Introductory remarks (par. 281).- b. Conclusion 1: No mental sentence properly so called can signify itself to be false (pars. 282–301).- i. First proof (pars. 283–284).- ii. Second proof (pars. 285–286).- iii. Third proof (pars. 287–289).- ?. Refutation of other views, including Marsilius of Inghen’s (pars. 288–289).- iv. Fourth proof (pars. 290–296).- ?. Refutation of Marsilius’ view (pars. 292–296).- v. Corollaries (pars. 297–301).- ?. Corollary 1 (par. 297).- ?. Corollary 2 (pars. 298–299).- ?. Corollary 3 (par. 300).- ?. Corollary 4 (par. 301).- c. Conclusion 2: No mental sentence properly so called can signify itself to be true (pars. 302–306).- d. Conclusion 3: There are no self-referential mental sentences properly so called (pars. 307–310).- e. Objection to Conclusion 1 (pars. 311–326).- i. Statement of the objection (pars. 311–312).- ii. Supposition in mental sentences (pars. 313–326).- ?. Conclusion 1: A part of a mental sentence properly so called cannot supposit for the whole sentence (pars. 313–317).- ?. Conclusion 2: Or for the contradictory of that sentence (pars. 318–319).- ?. Conclusion 3 (pars. 320–321).- ?. Conclusion 4: No part of a conventionally signifying sentence can supposit for a corresponding mental sentence properly so called (pars. 322–323).- ?. Corollaries from Conclusions 1 through 4 (pars. 324–326).- Introductory remarks (par. 324).- Corollary 1: Reply to the objection in pars. 311–312 (par. 325).- Corollary 2 (par. 326).- f. Conclusion 4: Self-reference is possible in sentences signifying by convention, in any of the ways mentioned in pars. 253– 261 (pars. 327–336).- i. Corollary 1: Every insoluble is a spoken, written or mental sentence improperly so called (par. 329).- ii. Corollary 2: Parts of spoken, written or mental sentences improperly so called can supposit for their wholes (pars. 330–336).- ?. Objections to Corollary 2, with replies (pars. 332–336).- V. Chapter Four: Truth and falsehood of insolubles (pars. 337–383).- A. Introductory remarks (par. 337).- B. Assumption 1: Every insoluble has some corresponding mental sentence properly so called (pars. 338–339).- C. Assumption 2: The terms of an insoluble and a mental sentence properly so called corresponding to it signify and supposit for the the same (pars. 340–342).- D. Assumption 3: Howsoever an insoluble signifies the case to be, so does some mental sentence or sentences (pars. 343–344).- E. Assumption 4: Insolubles falsify themselves, and so are false (pars. 345–347).- F. Conclusion 1: Every insoluble corresponds to a true mental sentence (pars. 348–349).- G. Conclusion 2: Every insoluble corresponds to a false mental sentence (pars. 350–353).- H. Conclusion 3: Every insoluble corresponds to two unconjoined mental sentences, one true and one false (pars. 354–358).- 1. Corollary 1 (par. 357).- 2. Corollary 2 (par. 358).- I. Conclusion 4: Insolubles are true and false at the same time (pars. 359–383).- 1. Corollary 1: So are their contradictories (par. 361).- 2. Corollary 2 (par. 362).- 3. Corollary 3: Some apparent contradictories are not contradictory in fact (pars. 363–368).- a. The formation of contradictories (pars. 365–368).- 4. Corollary 4: No insoluble or its contradictory is absolutely true or absolutely false (par. 369).- 5. Objection involving some of the above points (pars. 370–376).- 6. Corollary 5: No insoluble is absolutely impossible (par. 377).- 7. Corollary 6: No insoluble or its contradictory should be absolutely conceded or absolutely denied (pars. 378–383).- Notes.